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Criminal law, for much of the nineteenth century and part of the twentieth, 
was at the forefront of interdisciplinary studies in law. Criminologists 
borrowed heavily from psychology, sociology, and philosophy in an attempt to 
understand why people act the way they do and how government should punish 
them. Yet recently, a movement inward has dominated criminal law 
scholarship. Suffused by doctrine after doctrine, many criminal law scholars 
now are content to accept technical legal rules instead of asking whether those 
rules accord with modern knowledge about human behavior. 
Recent years have witnessed a tremendous outpouring of research in 
economics, psychology, sociology, and other disciplines concerning how 
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institutions, incentives, and rules actually affect behavior. This research has 
had a significant impact on criminal law scholarship. But it has had almost 
none on popular criminal law textbooks and thus (we suspect) next to none on 
the education of criminal lawyers.1 
The narrowness of conventional criminal law is unfortunate. The 
implosion may lead to incomplete answers to age-old questions in criminal 
law, and it has deterred criminal lawyers from asking questions that are 
commonplace in other areas of law. Perhaps most importantly the failure to 
fully engage in the classroom the kinds of questions that are being pursued in 
contemporary scholarship puts our students at risk of being ill-equipped to deal 
with the pressing questions of criminal justice policy.2 
This state of affairs is in desperate need of correction. To illustrate, we 
review some basic themes that a useful casebook on criminal aw should cover. 
We will sketch four areas in which interdisciplinary approaches to thinking 
about the purposes punishment can and should be incorporated into teaching 
criminal law. Notably, each case emphasizes nonretributivist approaches to 
punishment, which we believe have gotten short shrift in criminal law 
textbooks published most recently. The four areas are: (1) the impact of social 
science research on our contemporary understandings of punishment; (2) 
modern doctrinal analogues to theft - computer crimes; (3) expressive values 
of punishment; and (4) criminal law and the legislative process. Through our 
examination of these four areas, we hope to demonstrate the problems with the 
typical, stunted view of punishment and the value of our approach. 
I. Punishment and Social Science: What Works, What Doesn't, and 
Why 
To the detriment of students, legal casebooks largely limit their focus to 
classic deterrence insights. The standard trope in criminal law, both in 
scholarship as well as contemporary public understanding, is that enacting high 
penalties on a particular crime will deter offenders from committing it.3 The 
1. Each of us has taught the basic criminal law course at our respective institutions and 
elsewhere over the last eight years. We have reviewed and used in our own courses some of 
the books cited below. The themes we will discuss in this Article have grown out of our own 
attempts to supplement the materials in the casebook we have adopted. 
2. It was notable that in her Keynote Speech for this Symposium, former Attorney 
General Janet Reno spoke of the great need for more in-depth empirical analysis of 
punishment. We believe that some of the questions posed by Attorney General Reno have 
begun to be answered in the literature. Our students should be exposed to such literature. 
3. "[S]ociety hopes to deter wrongdoing by posing specific punishments . . . with the 
expectation that the punishment will have a double effect: both convincing the lawbreaker 
not to repeat his transgression and, at the same time, serving as a 'cautionary tale,' a 
warning deterrent to other members of society." Nicholas N. Kittrie & Elyce H. Zenoff, 
Sanctions, Sentencing, and Corrections: Law, Policy and Practice 15 (1981); see 
United States v. Ursery, 518 U.S. 267, 319 (1996) (Stevens, J., dissenting) ('"[C]ongress[] 
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traditional analysis simply turns on whether the penalty is set at an appropriate 
level to optimize deterrence - balancing the cost of the activity against the cost 
of enforcement. We do not dispute the central insights of economic theory that 
people generally act to maximize their preferences and that crime is an area 
ripe for application of these concepts. However, modern deterrence analysis 
must incorporate several refinements to the deterrence function, particularly: 
substitution effects, decision framing, educational impact of laws, social 
control, and perceived legitimacy. We will discuss each in turn. 
A. Substitution Effects 
The most pervasive economic conception of criminal law, made famous in 
modern times by economist Gary Becker, views the legal sanction for a given 
act as its "price" and asks whether that price will exceed the benefit of the 
criminal act to the criminal.4 Within the economic tradition itself, some (most 
preeminently George Stigler) have explained that this calculation misses a 
crucial variable for optimality: marginal deterrence. The idea is essentially the 
problem of cliffs - exacting equal penalties for crimes of lesser and greater 
magnitude leads to crimes of greater magnitude: "If the thief has his hand cut 
off for taking five dollars, he had just as well take $5,000."5 The marginal 
inten[ded] to punish . . . those involved in drug trafficking' because 'the traditional criminal 
sanctions ... are inadequate to deter or punish the enormously profitable trade in dangerous 
drugs.'") (citation omitted); Carmona v. Ward, 576 F.2d 405, 415 (2d Cir. 1978) (upholding 
mandatory maximum life sentence for three women convicted of minor drug trafficking 
offenses under New York law, finding that the law's "stated purposes to achieve the 
isolation and the deterrence of drug traffickers are acceptable goals of punishment"); George 
James, 113 Officers To Fight Drugs At Queens Site, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 8, 1988, at Bl 
(quoting Rudolph W. Giuliani, then U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of New York, 
saying that drug dealers "calculate the amount of money they make against the risk they are 
taking. Anyone who tells you the death penalty isn't a deterrent doesn't know the drug 
trade."). 
4. Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. Pol. ECON. 
169(1968). 
5. George J. Stigler, The Optimum Enforcement of Laws, 78 J. POL. ECON. 526, 527 
(1970). Stigler' s observations track those of Beccaria and Bentham. Beccaria said that "[i]f 
an equal punishment is laid down for two crimes which damage society unequally, men will 
not have a stronger deterrent against committing the greater crime if they find it more 
advantageous to do so." Cesare Beccaria, On Crimes and Punishments, in On Crimes and 
Punishments and Other Writings 21 (Richard Bellamy ed., Richard Davies trans., 1995). 
Bentham argued that the goal of a sanction is "to induce a man to choose always the least 
mischievous of two offences; therefore where two offences come in competition, the 
punishment for the greater offence must be sufficient to induce a man to prefer the less." 
Jeremy Bentham, An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation 168 
(J.H. Burns & H.L.A. Hart eds., Athlone Press 1970) (1789) (emphasis omitted); see also 
Jeremy Bentham, The Theory of Legislation 201 (N. M. Tripathi Private Ltd. 1975) 
(1802) ("Where two offences are in conjunction, the greater offence ought to be subjected to 
severer punishment, in order that the delinquent may have a motive to stop at the lesser.") 
(emphasis omitted). 
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deterrence argument, therefore, is one about creating incentives for individuals 
to refrain from committing the same crime on a greater scale. While the 
traditional question asks whether a penalty for X deters X, the marginal 
deterrence one asks whether a penalty for X may prompt commission of the 
marginally more severe crime X + 1 because that crime receives the same 
magnitude of punishment asX.6 Unfortunately, contemporary casebooks, when 
they mention deterrence, generally omit this key point. Instead, the analysis is 
framed as whether a higher penalty on X will produce greater "deterrence," 
without asking what activity precisely is being deterred and what behavior is 
being encouraged through the law.7 
Once economics is taken seriously, the problems with contemporary 
criminal law analysis become even more acute. Marginal deterrence is only the 
tip of the iceberg, for it functions as an illustration of a broader concept at 
work: substitution effects. Put simply, two products are substitutes when they 
compete with each other and are complements when they "go together." 
Consumers will tend to use more of a good - to substitute in favor of the 
good - when its relative price falls, and to use less of it - to substitute away 
from the good - when its relative price increases. If the price of tea increases, 
for example, substitution theory predicts that the demand for coffee would 
increase. But the demand for other products that go with tea, such as lemons, 
may drop because tea and lemons are complementary products. 
6. For that reason, Stigler's solution to the marginal deterrence problem was to state 
that "[e]xpected penalties [should] increase with expected gains so there is no marginal net 
gain from larger offenses." Stigler, supra note 5, at 53 1. 
7. See John Kaplan, Robert Weisberg & Guyora Binder, Criminal Law: Cases 
and Materials 46 (4th ed. 2000) ("A consistent finding of empirical studies of deterrence 
is that increases in the certainty of punishment have a greater deterrent effect than increases 
in the severity of the punishment."); Wayne R. LaFave, Criminal Law 28-29 (4th ed. 
2003) ("It does seem fair to assume, however, that the deterrent efficacy of punishment 
varies considerably, depending upon a number of factors .... The magnitude of threatened 
punishment is clearly a factor, but perhaps not as important a consideration as the 
probability of discovery and punishment."); Stephen A. Saltzburg, John L. Diamond, 
Kit Kinports & Thomas H. Morawetz, Criminal Law 102 (2d ed. 2000) ("The basic 
reasoning behind general deterrence is impeccable. It doesn't take much psychology or 
observation to know that persons are deterred from actions likely to have painful 
consequences. Jeremy Bentham left us common-sense guidelines for administering a system 
of this kind. For example, he suggested that there is an inverse relationship between the 
severity of the punishment and its certainty . . . .") (citation omitted); K. Greenawalt, Moral 
Justifications and Legal Punishment, in Encyclopedia OF Crime and Justice 1337-42 (S. 
Kadish ed., 1983), reprinted in Paul H. Robinson, Fundamentals of Criminal Law 36- 
37 (2d ed. 1995) [hereinafter Fundamentals of Criminal Law] ("With a properly 
developed penal code, the benefits to be gained from criminal activity would be outweighed 
by the harms of punishment, even when those harms were discounted by the probability of 
avoiding detection. Accordingly, the greater the temptation to commit a particular crime and 
the smaller the chance of detection, the more severe the penalty should be .... The actual 
imposition of punishment creates fear in the offender that if he repeats his act, he will be 
punished again .... To deter an offender from repeating his actions, a penalty should be 
severe enough to outweigh in his mind the benefits of the crime."). 
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Instead of framing the deterrence inquiry as simply whether a penalty for 
crime X will reduce X (the conventional perspective) or lead to X+l (the 
marginal deterrence one), another question that has to be asked is whether the 
penalty on X will distort behavior and lead people to commit an altogether 
different crime (, Z, or some combination of the two). Y and Z may be other 
crimes, or they may be lawful endeavors. The possibility of lawful endeavors 
illustrates just how criminal law has unconsciously relied on the substitution 
concept: The whole point of deterrence is to make the price of a crime high 
enough so that a criminal will "substitute" forgoing the crime. Just as a high 
price on train rides means that some people will not take them and ride 
bicycles instead, a high price on a crime, it is thought, means people will not 
commit that criminal act. When it comes to crime, however, most of us don't 
take the economics seriously enough to examine whether an analogue to the 
bicycles exists: We assume that deterrence works and - poof! - a would-be 
lawbreaker is now magically converted into a law-abider. 
Consider, for example, the way our government treats crack cocaine. 
Congress passed dramatic penalties against crack cocaine only a few days after 
learning of the drug's existence.8 The mandatory-minimum scheme Congress 
enacted provides that a minor crack dealer caught with five grams of crack will 
be in jail for at least sixty months, even on a first offense.9 Yet legislators 
never gave serious consideration to what the impact of high crack penalties 
would be on consumption of other drugs. Much attention has been given to the 
racial implications of the disparity between powder cocaine and crack 
cocaine.10 But none on substitution effects. 
This lack of attention to substitution issues is troubling given the 
significant disparity between punishments for possessing crack and 
punishments for possessing other drugs. Simply by weight, the ratio of crack to 
heroin penalties can be as high as 20: 1.11 Indeed, a dealer can carry 375 grams 
8. Elizabeth Tison, Amending the Sentencing Guidelines for Cocaine Offenses: The 
100-to-l Ratio Is Not As "Cracked" Up As Some Suggest, 27 S. ILL. U. L. J. 413, 416 
(2003) (describing rush to enact 1986 law). 
9. The base level under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines for 5 grams of crack is level 
26. U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 2Dl.l(c)(7) (1995). A level 26 offense earns 
between 63 and 78 months for the first offense. Five grams of crack is equivalent to 10 to 50 
doses. See U.S. Sentencing Comm'n, Cocaine and Federal Sentencing Policy viii 
(1995) [hereinafter Sentencing Comm'n Report]. This 200-plus page report, which is 
dedicated to eliminating the disparity between crack and powder cocaine, does not breathe a 
word about the impact of high crack sentences on heroin use (or even powder cocaine use 
for that matter). See generally id. 
10. See, e.g., David Cole, The Paradox of Race and Crime: A Comment on Randall 
Kennedy's "Politics of Distinction", 83 Geo. L.J. 2547, 2553-54 (1995) (discussing how 
many believe that the crack/powder difference is "racially discriminatory"). 
11. For a first-time offender, the base levels are the following: 5-10 grams of heroin is 
base level 14, providing a sentence of 15-21 months (whereas one-quarter to one-half gram 
of crack receives that penalty); 10-20 grams of heroin is base level 16, providing a sentence 
of 21-27 months (whereas one-half gram of crack receives that penalty); 20-40 grams of 
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of heroin and be punished at the same level - 5 to 6 years - as the 5-gram crack 
dealer. When drug dosage is factored into the equation, the crack to heroin 
punishment ratio can be 80:1 or even higher.12 As such, drug dealers, who are 
motivated at least in part by money and a desire to avoid incarceration, would 
be much better off carrying heroin instead of crack. And while it is difficult to 
test the substitution effect here without better data, crack consumption has 
decreased since 1988 while heroin consumption has increased.13 Perhaps the 
shift isn't due to substitution effects. But our policymakers, and our casebooks, 
do not even ask these questions.14 
heroin is base level 18, providing a sentence of 27-33 months (whereas 1 to 2 grams of crack 
receives that penalty); 40-60 grams of heroin is base level 20, providing a sentence of 33-41 
months (whereas 2 to 3 grams of crack receives that penalty); 60-80 grams of heroin is base 
level 22, providing a sentence of 41-51 months (whereas 3 to 4 grams of crack receives that 
penalty); 80-100 grams of heroin is base level 24, providing a sentence of 51-63 months 
(whereas 4 to 5 grams of crack receives that penalty); 100-400 grams of heroin is base level 
26, providing a sentence of 63-78 months (whereas 5 to 20 grams of crack receives that 
penalty); 400-700 grams of heroin is base level 28, providing a sentence of 78-97 months 
(whereas 20 to 35 grams of crack receives that penalty); and 700 to 1000 grams of heroin is 
base level 30, providing a sentence of 97-121 months (whereas 35 to 50 grams of crack 
receives that penalty). U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 2Dl.l(c) (2002), available 
at http://www.ussc.gov/2002guid/2002guid.pdf (last visited Mar. 11, 2004). 
12. This disparity is even greater, because a gram of heroin produces four to twenty 
times more doses than does a gram of crack. Compare United States v. Kinder, 64 F.3d 757, 
764 n.7 (2d Cir. 1995) (Leval, C.J., dissenting) (observing that single dose bags of heroin 
are generally 20 to 50 milligrams), and Office of Nat'l Drug Control Policy, Heroin 
Users in New York, Chicago, and San Diego 27 (1994) ("A bag of heroin in New York 
typically contains around 25 milligrams of pure heroin."), with The U.S. Sentencing 
Commission and Cocaine Sentencing Policy: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 104th Cong. 26 (1995) (statement of Michael Goldsmith, Commissioner, U.S. 
Sentencing Commission) (stating that crack dosages range from 100 to 500 milligrams), The 
U.S. Sentencing Commission and Cocaine Sentencing Policy: Hearing Before the Senate 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. 20 (1995) (statement of Judge Deanell Reece Tacha) 
(providing dosage information), Sentencing Comm'n Report, supra note 9, at viii (same), 
and Drug Enforcement Admin., United States Dep't of Justice, "Crack" Price Data, in 
Drugs & Crime Data: Crack Facts and Figures 50 (1996) (same). It is not clear to what 
extent these fractions control for purity. 
13. Univ. of Mich. Inst. for Soc. Research, Monitoring the Future: National 
Results on Adolescent Drug Use 17 (showing that the rate of crack cocaine use among 
8th, 10th, and 12th graders was approximately one-third lower in 2002 than it was in 1988), 
23 (finding that heroin use of 8th, 10th, and 12th graders doubled from 1988 to 2002) 
(2002), available at http://monitoringthefuture.org/pubs/monographs/overview2002.pdf (last
visited Mar. 11,2004). 
14. Even within the drug context, substitution may be at work in ways other than crack 
and heroin shifts. For example, the rise in so-called "designer drugs" might be explained by 
the criminalization of marijuana and other soft drugs. The dangers of designer drugs - many 
of which are made by amateur teenage chemists and are deadly - arguably dwarf the health 
dangers of marijuana use. A more obvious substitution may be excessive teenage cigarette 
smoking and drinking, perhaps in part the result of the high price of other types of drugs. 
Another somewhat less obvious form of substitution may be the increase in drug purity. 
Because the penalty structure uses the weight of a drug as the relevant factor in sentencing, 
drug dealers have compensated for the increased risk of sentences by increasing purity. For 
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Thinking about criminal law, it is easy to understand how crimes 
committed for profit, like drug dealing, are ripe candidates for substitution 
analysis, but it is more difficult to imagine how other crimes can be analyzed in 
such terms. Yet even crimes of passion may be examined in terms of 
substitution.15 Passion, after all, comes in different forms, and a penalty 
structure may induce people to act in particular ways by assigning costs to 
particular passionate activities. As Richard Herrnstein puts it, when husbands 
and wives start throwing dishes at each other, they do not usually throw the 
fine china.16 
Take what seems like the quintessential example in which substitution 
would not occur: rape. Insofar as these categories are separable - and the 
argument does not depend on their separation - is rape a crime of sex, 
violence, or domination? If rapists seek sex, it might follow that legalizing 
prostitution will reduce the frequency of rape. If they seek to dominate and 
humiliate, legalized prostitution may provide a substitute as well.17 To the 
extent that rapists seek violence, lowering the penalties for other violence, say 
assaults, may reduce the commission of rapes. Conversely, a high penalty for 
rape may mean that there are more instances of spousal abuse and other 
violence. These ideas are not policy suggestions, only possible illustrations of 
substitution at work. There may be many reasons why legalized prostitution is 
problematic - including its potential complementarity to rape.18 But the 
complementarity between prostitution and rape itself suggests that 
interrelationships between behavior cannot be ignored. 
Even when the penalties for a crime are so high that it appears that all the 
these reasons, the Supreme Court's decision in Neal v. United States, 516 U.S. 284 (1996), 
which held that the carrier medium for LSD would be weighed in determining a mandatory- 
minimum sentence, might exacerbate the drive to increase purity to reduce the expected 
punishment. Increased purity, for its part, might produce a great deal of harm, both in terms 
of addiction and accidental overdoses. 
15. See Herbert L. Packer, The Limits of the Criminal Sanction 41-42 (1968) 
(arguing that Bentham's rational-actor deterrence model helps analyze even "irrational" and 
"impulsive" crimes). 
16. See James Q. Wilson, Thinking About Crime 127 (Vintage Books, rev. ed. 
1985) (1975) (quoting Hernnstein) [hereinafter Wilson, Thinking About Crime]. 
17. Because substitution effects are a response to both the preferences of an actor and 
the relative price of different criminal acts, the effects can be pronounced even when 
preferences or relative prices are quite lopsided. To take a simple economic example, when 
filet mignon is five times as expensive as McDonald's hamburgers, some will substitute the 
hamburgers, but some will not - despite the lower price for the latter. But when the price of 
the hamburger drops to nearly zero, greater substitution will occur. Similarly, while the 
current lower penalty for solicitation (as opposed to rape) may already engender positive 
substitution effects, lowering the penalty for solicitation even further could produce greater 
amounts of substitution. 
18. Consider, for example, the potential complementarity between legalized 
prostitution and rape and the harm legalized prostitution might do to the status of women. 
See generally Neal Kumar Katyal, Men Who Own Women: A Thirteenth Amendment 
Critique of Forced Prostitution, 103 YaleL.J. 791 (1993) (discussing such possibilities). 
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crime that can be deterred will be deterred, substitution presents other possible 
problems. After all, one result of a higher penalty may be an increase in 
criminal activity - both of the particular crime and of other crimes. As 
explained above, at high prices, many crimes may substitute for one crime. The 
rapist who is determined to rape a particular woman and is not deterred by a 
high penalty for rape may go out and commit other crimes. He may first 
commit the rape, then kill the victim, and finally assault unrelated others, 
because the cost of future criminal activity is negligible. If, on the other hand, 
the penalty for rape is not high, the marginal cost of additional criminal activity 
may be much higher. 
To take another example, imagine the potential consequences of the "three 
strikes you're out" rule that has recently been implemented in several 
jurisdictions.19 If offenders know that on their third offense they will be jailed 
for life, they may be less likely to commit that third offense; but if they do, the 
offenders may make the third crime a drastic one. Indeed, they may even 
decide to kill the witnesses to their crimes, because - at least in states without a 
death penalty - there is nothing more that the government can do to them.20 
Viewed in these terms, the death penalty could provide an incentive for 
additional crime. The person who has already killed a victim in a state where 
such action qualifies for the death penalty will not have a legal incentive, or at 
least not a very strong one, to refrain from killing again. If a legal incentive 
exists, it is simply to avoid getting caught. But because deterrence is a function 
of both the sanction level and the probability that it will be imposed, the 
disincentive is lower for the repeat murderer than it is for the first-time one.21 
Since the penalty for one, two, or even three more murders is the same, the 
penalty itself does not work to provide additional deterrence. 
The inattention to substitution in contemporary criminal law is even more 
striking when it is juxtaposed against the everyday attention received by its 
economic opposite, complementarity. Prosecutors, for example, often will 
justify their aggressive prosecutions of narcotics traffickers on the ground that 
drug traffickers are likely to engage in violence.22 In other words, drug dealing 
19. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. 3559 (1994); Cal. Penal Code § 1170.12 (West 1997). 
20. See, e.g., William Tucker, Three Strikes and You're Dead, Am. Spectator, Mar. 
1994, at 22, 26 ("Three-strikes-you' re-out will only turn more victims of violent crime into 
murder victims. Dead men tell no tales."); Thaai Walker, Police Concerned About '3 
Strikes' Law: Crooks Facing Stiff Sentence May Become More Violent, S.F. Chron., Mar. 
14, 1994, at A15 (reporting a similar concern by police officers). 
21. The possibility of being caught may not be constant, as it might increase if the 
murders take a particular pattern, or if the murders are committed in one place, because the 
police may devote more resources to such a crime. But then, the logical response might be to 
simply substitute other crimes that have nothing to do with the initial one. 
22. See Victoria Churchville, Elusive Jamaican Drug Gangs Frustrate Police; 
Underworld Protects Newest and Most Violent Organized Crime Posses, Officials Say, 
Wash. Post, Feb. 23, 1988, at Al (stating that "law enforcement authorities here and 
elsewhere began to notice a pattern of public shootings between competing gangs of young 
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has a complementary relationship to violence, and even if drug dealing is not a 
terrible evil, punishing that dealing can avert greater harm to society. 
Policymakers, for their part, criminalize certain drugs like marijuana on the 
ground that they are "gateway" drugs that lead to consumption of harder, more 
dangerous, drugs. And yet the casebooks never point out that the policymakers 
get the question backwards:23 Shouldn't it be asked whether, by branding the 
common act of smoking marijuana a crime, criminalization creates the gateway 
effect in the first place? After all, those who smoke marijuana are now 
introduced to a variety of dealers who carry other illegal drugs, and the cost of 
undertaking a second criminal act is much lower than it is the first time around 
(particularly when the first time might produce beliefs in the illegitimacy of the 
criminal law in, for example, teenagers who question why marijuana is 
punished in a way that alcohol is not). 
Relationships of substitution and complementarity underscore a 
fundamental point about criminal law - that it will often influence tastes or 
preferences rather than constrain opportunity. Criminal law may be said to set 
itself apart from many other areas of the law because it concentrates more on 
altering people's preferences, particularly with its focus on criminal intent, 
which can be understood as a proxy for taste.24 Taste shaping explains why 
potential substitutes for a particular crime may radiate well beyond crimes with 
similar characteristics to the original one. 
A penalty structure has importance not only for current criminals, but for 
future ones. By shaping preferences, a penalty structure therefore may 
encourage people to choose certain lines of "work" - much the way that 
opportunities for profit guide many college students and channel them into 
certain jobs. A drastic change in the profitability of a career, say law, may not 
induce those who are already lawyers to switch to another career, but it may 
prevent many students from becoming lawyers in future years - not only 
because of profit, but because people internalize the belief that they do not 
Jamaicans who they believed were selling marijuana"); Maria Elena Fernandez & Bill 
Miller, 10 Members ofSW Gang Indicted on Drug Counts, Wash. Post, Sept. 23, 1998, at 
Bl ("[Standing beside a chart that listed the names of 31 victims of shootings - including 
13 homicides - attributed to the  Street Crew, [U.S. Attorney Wilma A.] Lewis said: 'This 
is a clear example of why marijuana use and dealing cannot - I repeat, cannot - simply be 
viewed as a harmless activity or a victimless crime.'"). 
23. For absence of such commentary, see, for example, Joshua Dressler, 
Understanding Criminal Law (2d ed. 1995); Kaplan et al., supra note 7; LaFave, supra 
note 7; Saltzburg et al., supra note 7. See also Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 
100-690 § 5011, 102 Stat. 4181, 4296 (1988) ("The Congress finds that legalization of 
illegal drugs, on the Federal or State level, is an unconscionable surrender in a war in which, 
for the future of our country and the lives of our children, there can be no substitute for total 
victory."). 
24. See Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt, An Economic Analysis of the Criminal Law as a 
Preference-Shaping Policy, 1990 Duke L.J. 1, 4 n.21 (making this argument); Cass R. 
Sunstein, Legal Interference with Private Preferences, 53 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1129, 1146 
(1986) ("It is hard to imagine a preference not shaped in part by legal arrangements."). 
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"want" to become lawyers. In a similar way, the point about substitution must 
be taken not only in terms of what current criminals will do, but what future 
criminals will do. 
Substitution theory expands on this insight by demonstrating that the law 
may shape tastes in perverse ways. If the penalty for consumption of one drug 
induces people to use other drugs, for example, these penalties are altering 
those people's desires. Punishment, therefore, can breed crime by increasing 
the taste for it and by reducing the "price" of future criminal activity. 
B. Decision Framing 
Consider an additional wrinkle in the deterrence story: Traditional 
understandings of deterrence ignore a wealth of research from psychology 
about the way in which people frame choices. Imagine, for example, two 
products of equal value to a consumer; Product A is high quality with a high 
price, while Product  is low quality with a low price. A consumer is 
indifferent between Product A and Product  because Product B's low price 
compensates for its low quality. If a third option, Product C, is introduced, with 
the same low price as Product  but even lower quality, people may begin to 
favor Product over Product A, because Product  makes Product look like 
a good value. Conversely, if Product  has the same high price as Product A 
but with less quality, people likely will buy more of Product A than Product B. 
Even though people are not receiving additional information, the extraneous 
information skews their choices. In other words, a particular option can 
become more desirable simply because the options are presented or framed 
along with irrelevant information.25 
The addition of an inferior alternative may thus enhance the desirability of 
a particular option. Cognitive psychologists dub this the asymmetric 
dominance effect - the tendency to prefer x over  increases by the addition of 
25. One study tested this prediction by offering groups of students hypothetical 
choices between two CD players on a one-day clearance sale. Eldar Shafir, Itamar Simonson 
& Amos Tversky, Reason-Based Choice, 49 COGNITION 1 1 (1993) [hereinafter Shafir et al., 
Reason-Based Choice]. The "popular SONY player" cost only $99 while a "top-of-the-line 
AIWA player" cost $169. Id. at 22. An equal number of students, 27%, picked each brand, 
and 46% chose to wait until they learned more about the various models. Id. On the other 
hand, a second group of students was posed the hypothetical without the AIWA model. Id. 
This time, 66% of people picked the SONY, and only 34% selected the deferment choice. 
Id. The third group of students was presented with a choice between the SONY, "an inferior 
AIWA player for the regular list price of $105," or the deferment choice. Id. at 23. This 
time, 73% picked the SONY player and only 24% picked deferment. Id. The introduction of 
the cheap AIWA should not have influenced the choice between deferment and the SONY, 
but it did. More people were willing to buy the SONY, which looked like a better deal once 
the cheap AIWA was shown. See id. at 22-23; see also Amos Tversky & Eldar Shafir, 
Choice Under Conflict: The Dynamics of Deferred Decision, 3 PSYCHOL. Sci. 358, 360-61 
(1992) (describing similar findings). 
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alternative z that is inferior to x but superior to y.26 Here is a clear example: 
Simonson and Tversky offered subjects a choice between $6 and "an elegant 
Cross pen."27 36% chose the pen and 64% took the cash. A second group was 
given the choice between $6, the Cross pen, and a second, less attractive, pen. 
This time, 46% took the Cross and 52% chose the cash. Again, the cheap pen 
option should not influence the choice between the Cross pen and the cash. Yet 
it does. Closely related to this is the finding of extremeness aversion, which 
shows that within an offered set, options with extreme values are relatively less 
attractive than those with intermediate values.28 
Both asymmetric dominance and extremeness aversion are explanations of 
why reference points influence choices between options. The substitution 
perspective predicts that individuals do not view the costs and benefits of a 
particular crime in a vacuum. Rather, they examine them in light of the costs 
and benefits of other crimes. The psychological addendum to substitution 
suggests that people evaluate the relative harms and benefits of a particular 
crime by using reference points. Consequently, when the law proclaims, 
through a harsh penalty, that the cost of a particular activity is very high, it 
might make other crimes appear more attractive than they were before the 
penalty. 
A harsh penalty on an activity might, therefore, invert Johannes 
Andenaes's idea of general deterrence. Andenaes argues that the criminal law 
creates deterrence by educating people about those acts that should not be 
done.29 But Andenaes's educational effect can be stood on its head. High 
penalties on crime X may not only educate people about the particular danger 
of X, but also about the comparably less dangerous - that is, less punished - 
crimes Y and Z, even if Y and Z are in reality more dangerous. Y and Z may 
then look more attractive than they did before. So, for example, by penalizing 
crack as an extremely dangerous drug, the high crack penalties, via 
extremeness aversion, could make heroin look better than it did before and 
26. See generally Joel Huber, John W. Payne & Christopher Puto, Adding 
Asymmetrically Dominated Alternatives: Violations of Regularity and the Similarity 
Hypothesis, 9 J. Consumer Res. 90 (1982) (describing asymmetric dominance); Douglas H. 
Wedell, Distinguishing Among Models of Contextually Induced Preference Reversals, 17 J. 
Experimental Psychol. 767 (1991) (same). 
27. Itamar Simonson & Amos Tversky, Choice in Context: Tradeoff Contrast and 
Extremeness Aversion, 29 J. Marketing Res. 281, 287 (1992). 
28. See generally Itamar Simonson, Choice Based on Reasons: The Case of Attraction 
and Compromise Effects, 16 J. CONSUMER ES. 158 (1989) (describing extremeness 
aversion). For example, subjects in one study were shown five cameras varying in quality 
and price. Shafir et al., Reason-Based Choice, supra note 25, at 25. One group was given a 
choice between a $170 Minolta and a higher quality $240 Minolta. The second group was 
given the additional option of an even higher quality $470 Minolta. In the first group, 
subjects were split between the two cameras, but, in the second group, 57% chose the 
middle option and the remaining subjects were equally divided between the two extremes. 
Id 
29. See generally JOHANNES ANDENAES, PUNISHMENT AND DETERRENCE ( 1 974). 
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thereby increase the taste for it. 
 Educational Impact of Criminal Law 
Implicit in the discussion up to this point has been the assumption that 
people know what the penalties actually are. The skeptic is rightfully 
concerned: How can policymakers expect would-be lawbreakers to know such 
details? And if people do not know the law and do not understand the penalties, 
then how can deterrence ever function? Traditional economic analysis of 
criminal law, too focused on the price of criminal conduct, has not explained 
how preferences can be shaped in a world of unknown prices and therefore has 
made it easy for many (including several leading casebooks) to dismiss 
deterrence altogether with the formulaic claim that criminals do not know the 
law.30 
Yet an explanation is not that hard to offer. The educational impact of the 
criminal law is not a brittle Skinnerian stimulus and response, but rather one 
that works through a complex process of social interaction. A small group of 
people may look at the sentencing structure and be influenced by its relative 
treatment of crimes. As time passes, the information this group possesses will 
trickle down but now in a way no longer tied to sentencing. Instead, it may 
simply be said that activity X is worse than activity Y. People who have never 
eaten caviar, for example, do not need to know its cost for their preferences to 
be affected by the price - particularly when the high price places a stigma on 
caviar-eaters as being greedy and selfish. In such circumstances, even if the 
monetary price of the good is unknown, the social price (which is in part a 
function of the monetary one) will deter consumption. 
In this way, contemporary understanding of deterrence must take into 
account the educational impact of the criminal law. As Andenaes argued, 
penalties send out "messages" to members of society, and these messages exert 
30. See Richard J. Bonnie, Anne M. Coughlin, John C. Jeffries, Jr. & Peter W. 
Low, Criminal Law 14 (1997) (exerpting from John Dilulio's Journal of Economic 
Perspectives article, Help Wanted: Economists, Crime and Public Policy, 10 J. ECON. 
Persp. 3, 10, 17 (1996), the claim that "[t]he extraordinary degree to which today's young 
street criminals are present oriented, and the extent to which they do crime for fun as well as 
for profit, has yet to be taken fully into account by economists. 'You never think about 
doing thirty,' one young prisoner told me, 'when you don't expect to live to thirty.'"); 
Arnold J. Loewy, Criminal Law: Cases and Materials 9 (2d ed. 2000) (quoting Leuch 
v. State, 633 P.2d 1006 (Alaska 1981), where the court observed that "[t]he superior court 
also expressed the view that the deterrent effect of a sentence on the general community is 
negligible in practically any case because, in the superior court's view, sentences are not 
significantly publicized to have any significant impact"); Wilson, Thinking About Crime, 
supra note 16, at 118 ("The reason there is a debate among scholars about deterrence is that 
the socially imposed consequences of committing a crime, unlike the market consequences 
of shopping around for the best price, are characterized by delay, uncertainty, and 
ignorance."). 
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a moral influence that inculcates social norms.31 This theory of messages thus 
gives meaning to English jurist James Fitzjames Stephen's statement on why 
most men abstain from murder: 
Some men, probably, abstain from murder because they fear that, if they 
committed murder, they would be hung. Hundreds of thousands abstain from 
it because they regard it with horror. One great reason why they regard it with 
horror is, that murderers are hung with the hearty approbation of all 
reasonable men.32 
Stephen realized that a penalty can have an unconscious deterrent effect 
through a subtle changing of social norms. Stephen's words, therefore, mark 
him for more than the general deterrence theory for which he is cited today. 
Stephen believed that a penalty can affect the behavior of more than the 
individual punished - the general deterrence point. But he also argued that the 
criminal law has an educational effect and that this effect may dwarf general 
deterrence.33 Note also Stephen's important assumption about taste-shaping, 
that murder is regarded with horror because of the penalty structure.34 As such, 
the substitution effect cannot be confined merely to calculating criminals who 
weigh the sanction on activity X and compare it to the one for activity Y. 
Rather, its power lies in the way in which a particular sanction influences not 
simply the relative legal price, but the social price as well. 
But the claim about creating social prices, through punishment's 
inculcation of social "norms," itself misses a fundamental problem - 
punishment's effect on the criminal. By segregating such actors from 
mainstream America, the criminal law may reinforce a tendency towards 
criminal action. In economic terms, when an individual cannot get hired for 
lawful work because she was once an outlaw, the relative cost of illegal 
activity decreases. Moreover, from a psychological perspective, those branded 
outlaws may begin to internalize such labels and fulfill the expectation that 
they believe the criminal system and society have for them. Instead of reducing 
crime, stigmatization strategies may increase the criminal activity of particular 
actors. 
The provenance of this claim lies in sociologist Erving Goffman's work on 
stigma.35 Goffman explains that "normal" society shuns stigmatized 
individuals - those that deviate from the norm. Such individuals may choose 
either to correct the stigma (for example, a physically deformed person who 
elects plastic surgery), devote effort to overcome the stigma's effect and thus 
3 1 . Andenaes , supra note 29 . 
32. James Fitzjames Stephen, A General View of the Criminal Law of England 
99(1863). 
33. And for this reason, Stephen claimed that "the sentence of the law is to the moral 
sentiment of the public in relation to any offence what a seal is to hot wax." Id. at 81. 
34. Dau-Schmidt, supra note 24, at 18 n.88. 
35. Erving Goffman, Stigma: Notes on the Management of Spoiled Identity 
(1963). 
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open doors that appear closed (for example, work hard in school to compensate 
for the deformity), or join with others who face the same stigma.36 Those who 
cannot remove the stigma, whose identities are spoiled, will often arrange their 
lives to avoid contact with normal - that is, unstigmatized - people. Even if the 
deformity can be hidden, the risk of being exposed will often serve as an 
inducement to avoid such contacts. 
Both internal and external avoidance prompts those with stigma to find 
sympathetic others. Those with the similar stigma can provide the individual 
with moral support and the comfort of feeling at ease.37 Goffman concentrates 
primarily on physical and social handicaps, but his conceptualization of stigma 
provides two useful insights into criminal punishment. First, criminal 
punishment imposes a stigma on individuals that may lead criminals to avoid 
contact with law-abiding people. For the criminal, outside contact becomes 
problematic because of the risk that normal people will disapprove or define a 
criminal only in terms of his stigma.38 Outsiders, for their part, will avoid a 
criminal because of the possibility that being seen with one will contaminate 
them both socially and legally. Criminals may use the stigma as a way to 
justify their career choices, much the way those with scars and harelips may 
justify their decisions.39 Thus, those who have already committed crime may 
feel that other options are closed to them and continue their criminal activity.40 
Second, stigmatization from the law-abiding world will prompt criminals 
to band together with others like them. The stigma imposed from outsiders is 
celebrated within this group, and their norms differ from the world of the 
nonstigmatized. They develop subnorms that may be antithetical to those of the 
law-abiding world. This may become both an inducement to further crime, as 
lawbreaking is seen as a socially positive act within the group, and a 
disincentive to noncriminal alternatives. As one criminal describes it: 
I can remember ... on more than one occasion . . . going into a public library 
near where I was living, and looking over my shoulder a couple of times 
before I actually went in, just to make sure no one who knew me was standing 
36. Mat 9-10, 23-25. 
37. Mat 20. 
38. Consider what one criminal said: 
And I always feel this with straight people - that whenever they're being nice to me, 
pleasant to me, all the time really, underneath they're only assessing me as a criminal and 
nothing else. It's too late for me to be any different now to what I am, but I still feel this 
keenly, that that's their only approach, and they're quite incapable of accepting me as 
anything else. 
Tony Parker & Robert Allerton, The Courage of His Convictions 1 1 1 (1962). 
39. See William Y. Baker & Lauren H. Smith, Facial Disfigurement and Personality, 
112 JAMA 301, 303 (1939) (describing how such physical deformities become 
"unconsciously all embracing"). 
40. Some support exists for the claim that the stigma imposed by criminal sentences 
precludes lawful employment. See Herbert S. Miller, The Closed Door: The Effect of 
a Criminal Record on Employment with State and Local Public Agencies 
(Manpower Admin., U.S. Dep't of Labor Contract No. 81-09-70-02, 1972). 
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about and seeing me do it.41 
Goffman's work thus reinforces the explanatory power of adaptive preference 
and anomie theories. The former theory explains how the preferences of 
lawbreakers develop - as an adaptation to a world where crime is a more 
realistic option than lawful employment. The latter explains how such attitudes 
become entrenched within a social group and how subnorms originate out of 
that interaction. 
In this fashion, social norms strategies can force additional crimes. The 
youth who is caught selling one vial of crack emerges from confinement as a 
social pariah. He internalizes that belief and avoids contact with the law- 
abiding world. His isolation from the lawful world leads him to keep company 
with other pariahs. The subnorms of this group reward the criminal activity that 
the law-abiding world punishes, and devalues the lawful alternatives that the 
law-abiding world celebrates. The punishment, then, produces the crime it was 
intended to prevent. What is more, it may even produce other types of crime, 
substitutions of sorts, both because stigmatized individuals avoid the law- 
abiding world and because they may learn new ways of earning money from 
members of the stigmatized group. 
D. Inverse Sentencing Effect 
Incorporating social norms into criminal law analysis also illustrates other 
defects in the opportunity-shaping view of behavior. The traditional approach 
ignores the way in which people react to high penalties. Such penalties create 
what may be termed an inverse sentencing effect. High penalties, instead of 
increasing conviction rates, may decrease them. As penalties increase, people 
may not be as willing to enforce them because of the disproportionate impact 
on those caught. 
Several different mechanisms are responsible for the inverse sentencing 
effect. When the penalties are high, for example, the public may not be willing 
to turn lawbreakers in, police and prosecutors may not want to prosecute, and 
jurors may not vote to convict. Legal scholar Frederick Beutel observed this 
phenomenon in his study of bad check laws.42 He found that in Colorado fewer 
bad checks were written because the punishment was weaker but enforcement 
41 . Parker & Allerton, supra note 38, at 109 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
42. See FREDERICK K. BEUTEL, SOME POTENTIALITIES OF EXPERIMENTAL 
Jurisprudence as a New Branch of Social Science 365-67 (1957). Some studies show, 
moreover, that one effect of three-strikes laws is that prosecutors tend not to use them. See 
Henry J. Reske, Hardly Hardball: Prosecutors in Most of 22 States Studied Are Not Using 
Three-Strikes Laws Against Repeat Offenders, 82 A.B.A. J. 26 (1996). Other evidence 
shows that those who are charged under three-strikes laws refuse to plea bargain and clog 
the courts, which in turn prevents the administration of swift sentencing. See Cyndee 
Fontana, 'Three Strikes' Law is Bearing Down on Fresno Courts, Fresno Bee, Jan. 21, 
1996, at Al. 
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was more consistent.43 In Nebraska, by contrast, he discovered that Nebraska's 
severe punishment for bad checks hampered enforcement and conviction.44 
Similarly, in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, even though the number 
and severity of English penal laws had increased, English jurors regarded the 
penalties as excessive and were lenient in applying them.45 Of course, the law 
is only one variable that affects social norms, but when increasing the penalty 
on a particular law is out of step with norms in a community, it may reduce 
deterrence instead of promoting it. This real world effect is, again, contrary to 
most treatments of deterrence, which treat the probability of enforcement as a 
variable fungible with the extent of the sanction. 
E. Impact of Social Control 
Today more than two million people are incarcerated in state and federal 
prisons and local jails in the United States,46 and the notion of deterrence has 
heavily influenced the massive escalation of imprisonment over the last two 
decades.47 Despite the oft-repeated public rhetoric connecting the increase in 
the American imprisonment rate to deterrence, modern deterrence research has 
failed to find consistent evidence of the deterrent effects of punishment. 
Empirical evidence on the deterrent effects of punishment remains speculative 
and inconclusive, and the ability of formal punishment alone to deter crime 
appears to be quite limited.48 
43. Beutel, supra note 42, at 366-67. 
44. Id. 
45. See Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison 14 
(Alan Sheridan trans., Vintage Books 2d ed. 1995) (1977). Within the economic tradition, 
James Q. Wilson has pointed out that high sentences also mean that defendants are unlikely 
to plead guilty, which may reduce the speed with which sentences are imposed, itself an 
important factor in enhancing deterrence. Wilson, Thinking About Crime, supra note 16, 
at 134-35. 
46. U.S. Prison Population Tops 2 Million, at http://usgovinfo.about.com/cs/census 
statistic/a/aaprisonpop.htm (last visited Mar. 11, 2004) (noting that the American prison 
population topped 2 million in June of 2002). 
47. This is not to say that additional factors such as a concern for incapacitation or 
retribution do not also influence our current punishment practice. These factors also clearly 
have an important role. The recent rise in "three-strikes" legislation is obviously driven by 
incapacitation concerns, and there has been a long-standing role for retribution in 
sentencing. See, e.g., U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual 3 (1998) (discussing various 
rationales for sentencing including retribution in the form of just deserts). 
48. See generally Deterrence and Incapacitation: Estimating the Effects of 
Criminal Sanctions on Crime Rates (Alfred Blumstein, Jacqueline Cohen & Daniel 
Nagin eds., 1978) (collecting research on deterrent effects). See also Philip J. Cook, 
Research in Criminal Deterrence: Laying the Groundwork for the Second Decade, in 2 
Crime and Justice: An Annual Review of Research 211 (1980) (discussing the relative 
impact of the criminal justice system and "root causes" of crime); Lawrence W. Sherman, 
Douglas A. Smith, Janell D. Schmidt & Dennis P. Rogan, Crime, Punishment, and Stake in 
Conformity: Legal and Informal Control of Domestic Violence, 57 Am. Soc. Rev. 680, 687- 
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A final factor that should be assessed when discussing the purposes of 
punishment is the offender's community context and social role within that 
community. Understanding this broader context of social control is essential to 
understanding deterrence. 
Kirk Williams and Richard Hawkins suggest that community knowledge 
of an individual's probable involvement in a violent act is necessary in order to 
activate informal social controls.49 Community members acquire this 
knowledge from various sources ranging from the possibly public nature of 
formal intervention, such as an arrest, to information networks independent of 
the formal sanctioning agents. These informal and often interpersonal social 
controls often involve very explicit remedial actions that can raise the social 
costs of crime. In other words, the effectiveness of these controls requires that 
an offender perceive that his social ties and accomplishments will be 
jeopardized by his actions.50 
Understanding the deterrent effects of punishment requires not only 
recognition of the dimensions of legal punishment, but also whether legal 
punishment is a threat worth avoiding, that there is a job with economic and 
social value to lose, that relationships are stable and have value, and that the 
assailant is socially embedded in a neighborhood or work context that accords 
status or metes out shame and social opprobrium. 
Examination of connections to work (or a lack of them) provides a specific 
example of the impact on deterrence of the interaction between legal 
punishment and social controls. Research shows individuals with regularized 
paying jobs have commitments that enhance the deterrent effect of formal legal 
sanctions. However, as economist Richard Freeman and criminologist Jeff 
Fagan have noted, a sustained decline in wages for unskilled workers has 
weakened both attachments to work and incentives to participate.51 The returns 
from illegal work often exceed legal wages for workers with limited human 
capital or access to higher wage jobs and neutralize incentives to avoid crime 
and possible punishment.52 This is especially true in communities where large 
numbers of the jobless are concentrated.53 The attractions of illegal work are 
reflected in variables often unmeasured in quantitative studies on crime and 
88 (1992) (reviewing research on the impact of arrest on reduction of domestic violence). 
49. See Kirk R. Williams & Richard Hawkins, Wife Assault, Cost of Arrest, and the 
Deterrence Process, 29 J. RES. CRIME & Delinq. 292, 305 (1992) (showing that the social 
and personal costs of violence are greater when an individual's violent behavior is disclosed 
to neighbors or  workers). 
50. See id. 
51. Jeffrey Fagan & Richard B. Freeman, Crime and Work, 25 Crime & Just. 225 
(1999). 
52. See id. at 245-54 (comparing returns from legal and illegal work). 
53. See William Julius Wilson, When Work Disappears: The World of the New 
Urban Poor 57-72 (1996) [hereinafter Wilson, When Work] (discussing the incentives of 
individuals to turn to illegal work in communities of concentrated poverty where rates of 
joblessness are high). 
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work, especially "tastes and preferences" that inflate the nonmonetary 
dimensions of illegal work.54 
A fuller understanding of the purposes of punishment can be gained 
through an assessment of punishment at the community level rather than 
simply that of the individual - a macro rather than a micro level if you will. 
Sociological studies of communities provide just such a lens. 
For most of this century, criminologists have acknowledged the 
importance of community in explaining crime rates and activating processes of 
social control. Clifford Shaw and Henry McKay pioneered the study of such 
problems at the community level.55 Seeking to explain earlier findings that 
juvenile delinquency remained high in certain areas of central cities over time 
despite population turnover, they rejected individualistic explanations of 
delinquency.56 Instead, they looked to the processes by which law-breaking 
behavior could be transmitted across generations.57 They maintained that three 
structural factors - low economic status, ethnic heterogeneity, and residential 
mobility - led to the disruption of community social organization that, in turn, 
accounted for variation in crime and delinquency rates in a given area.58 
Because Shaw and McKay believed that the capacity of a community to 
maintain social control was a function of the structural context of that 
community, they looked to the community itself as the unit to explain crime 
rates in urban areas and not the individual. This was a path-breaking finding at 
54. See Jeff Grogger, Market Wages and Youth Crime, 16 J. Lab. Econ. 756, 777-79 
(1998) (presenting mathematical models of the relationship between work and youth crime 
and discussing "tastes" for crime); Sudhir Alladi Venkatesh, The Social Organization of 
Street Gang Activity in an Urban Ghetto, 103 Am. J. Soc. 82, 85, 108 (1997) (discussing 
alternative income structure of ghettoes and explaining the importance of noneconomic 
motivations behind involvement in the drug economy); W. Kip Vicusi, The Risks and 
Rewards of Criminal Activity: A Comprehensive Test of Criminal Deterrence, 4 J. Lab. 
Econ. 317(1986). 
55. See generally Clifford R. Shaw & Henry D. Mckay, Juvenile Delinquency 
and Urban Areas: A Study of Rates of Delinquency in Relation to Differential 
Characteristics of Local Communities in American Cities (rev. ed. 1969) (developing 
an ecological model of the persistence of crime rates in urban areas over time). 
56. It is clear from the data included in this volume that there is a direct relationship 
between conditions existing in local communities of American cities and differential rates of 
delinquents and criminals .... Delinquency - particularly group delinquency, which 
constitutes a preponderance of all officially recorded offenses committed by boys and young 
men - has its roots in the dynamic life of the community. 
Id. at 315. 
57. See id at 174, 316-21. 
58. Shaw and McKay found that the relationship between structural community factors 
and delinquency was substantial. They found a correlation of .89 between delinquency rates 
and Chicago community areas and a proxy measure for poverty - the number of families on 
relief. Id. at 146-47. They found a correlation of .60 between delinquency and population 
heterogeneity ("percentage of foreign-born and Negro heads of families"). Id. at 153. Both 
of these correlations are quite strong. See Lawrence  Hamilton, Modern Data 
Analysis: A First Course in Applied Statistics 481 tbl.14.5 (1990) (explaining the 
interpretation of correlation strength). 
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the time, since Shaw and McKay's contemporaries believed that associations 
between crime in urban areas and concentrations of African Americans and the 
foreign-born was due to the individual dispositions of group members, 
including genetic explanations for offending.59 
It is critical to understand the nature of the problem that Shaw and McKay 
were addressing. In contrast to the research that emphasizes the nature and 
extent of social controls that inhibit (or even encourage) an individual to 
engage in crime, Shaw and McKay sought to examine the differences between 
communities. Why, they asked, did some communities demonstrate high crime 
rates over time, while other communities do not? 
Contemporary researchers have extended Shaw and McKay's work by 
solidifying the notion of community characteristics as distinct from the 
aggregated demographic characteristics of individuals who live in 
communities.60 For example, researchers have demonstrated in several studies 
that violence is associated with poverty and residential instability in 
neighborhoods, making it clear that violence is connected to neighborhood 
composition as opposed to the spatial distribution of individuals with particular 
demographic characteristics.61 Additionally, researchers have recently made 
inroads in defining those characteristics that best enable social control and the 
realization of the common values of residents 
			 community social 
organization. 
In describing the continuous nature of community social organization, 
theorists have focused on three processes: (1) the prevalence, strength, and 
interdependence of social networks; (2) the extent of collective supervision by 
neighborhood residents and the level of personal responsibility they assume for 
addressing neighborhood problems; and (3) the rate of resident participation in 
voluntary and formal organizations.62 Their hypothesis is straightforward: 
59. See Robert J. Bursik, Jr. & Harold G. Grasmick, Neighborhoods and Crime: 
The Dimensions of Effective Community Control 25-27 (1993) (explaining scholarly 
disagreement over Shaw and McKay's findings when they were published and alternative 
explanations for high crime rates in urban areas). 
60. The research is "ecological" rather than "psychological. A fundamental 
assumption of ecological research is that social systems exhibit structural properties that can 
be examined apart from the personal characteristics of their members. See Brian J. L. 
Berry & John D. Kasarda, Contemporary Urban Ecology 13 (1977) (explaining this 
point). 
61. See, e.g., Douglas S. Massey, Getting Away with Murder: Segregation and Violent 
Crime in Urban America, 143 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1203 (1995) (describing how race and class 
segregation concentrates violent crime in poor, minority neighborhoods); Robert J. Sampson 
& Janet Lauritsen, Violent Victimization and Offending: Individual-, Situational-, and 
Community-Level Risk Factors, in UNDERSTANDING AND PREVENTING VIOLENCE 48-63 (A. 
Reiss & J. A. Roth eds., 1994) (summarizing the recent work applying social-ecological 
theory to explanations of the variation of criminal violence). 
62. See, e.g., WILSON, When WORK, supra note 53, at 20 (offering these three 
characteristics); Robert J. Sampson & W. Byron Groves, Community Structure and Crime: 
Testing Social-Disorganization Theory, 94 Am. J. Soc. 774, 777-82 (defining community 
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When the processes of community social organization are prevalent and strong, 
crime and delinquency should be less prevalent, and vice versa. 
Of course, the implication of this work is that criminal law policy - 
punishment - meted out among individuals living in community contexts can 
have an impact on the community's ability to regulate itself through informal 
means. It is not difficult to imagine the ways in which formal legal 
punishment - in potentially large amounts - could be beneficial to 
communities with a social structure that predicts a kind of social organization 
that is not conducive to crime resistance and control. As one of us writing 
about drug law enforcement in impoverished innercity communities has noted, 
"By relying on incarceration, law-abiders can create physical distance between 
themselves and law-breakers. In this way, . . . removal of law-breakers from 
the community [is] akin to leaving the neighborhood."63 
The strength of this supposition obviously depends on the probability of 
incarceration for drug offending as well as the length of the sentence. 
However, law abiders in high-crime communities can hope to gain other more 
long-term benefits from enforcement of tough drug laws in addition to 
temporary physical separation from lawbreakers, as the theory of community 
social organization suggests that enforcement of tough drug laws could lead to 
higher levels of neighborhood social organization and, consequently, less 
crime. Work by sociologist Rob Sampson and his coauthors demonstrates 
empirically that better networks are associated with lower levels of 
victimization and offending.64 They did not show that less crime leads to 
stronger networks (which, of course, could in turn prevent more crime). It is 
very likely, however, that the causal arrow runs in both directions. If long 
sentences actually deter drug offenders, and if the structural components of 
social organization also improve, the tough drug-law enforcement policy could 
potentially amplify its own crime-fighting ends. 
But there is reason to think that deterrence-based strategies aimed at drug 
offenses may actually impair the ability of a community to resist crime. Drug- 
law enforcement aimed at increasing the severity of punishment (by 
lengthening sentences) and the certainty of punishment (by increasing the 
number of people against whom the law is enforced) as traditional deterrence 
social organization this way); Robert J. Sampson & William Julius Wilson, Toward a 
Theory of Race, Crime, and Urban Inequality, in Crime AND Inequality 45 (John Hagan & 
Ruth D. Peterson eds., 1995) (same). 
63. Tracey L. Meares, Social Organization and Drug Law Enforcement, 35 Am. Crim. 
L. Rev. 191, 204 (1998) [hereinafter Meares, Social Organization]. 
64. See generally Jeffrey D. Morenoff, Robert J. Sampson & Stephen W. Raudenbush, 
Neighborhood Inequality, Collective Efficacy, and the Spatial Dynamics of Urban Violence, 
39 Criminology 517 (2001) (demonstrating empirically that friendship networks, 
neighborhood organizations, and participation in voluntary associations appear to reduce 
violence by the promotion of collective efficacy); Sampson & Groves, supra note 62, at 
788-89 (demonstrating that supervision of teenage peer groups is associated with lower 
crime rates and suggesting that friendship networks reinforce such supervision). 
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theory would prescribe, risks negative consequences for community social 
organization in poor, minority neighborhoods. Specifically, when punishment 
is heaped on a class of offenders that is not geographically dispersed but that is 
instead spatially concentrated, as is the class of low-level drug retailers, it is 
possible that the policy confounds its own crime-fighting ends by fueling the 
precursors to social organization disruption, such as family disruption, 
unemployment, and low economic status.65 
There is empirical research relevant to the iatrogenic effects of high rates 
of imprisonment in urban areas. The first piece of evidence concerns the 
clustering of imprisonment. If the social organization of communities is going 
to be impacted in ways that impair a community's ability to resist crime 
because of the removal (and subsequent return) of large numbers of offenders 
from a community, then the data should show that the increase of 
imprisonment over time is concentrated in residential neighborhoods. There is 
a small body of literature on the topic, but it is clear: The expansion of 
incarceration in the United States has not been randomly distributed in 
geographic space. It is well known that young black men bear the largest 
proportional burden of any demographic group of imprisonment,66 but city- 
based data also demonstrate that prison admissions and returns are 
concentrated in neighborhoods. Todd Clear, Dina Rose, Elin Waring, and 
Kristen Scully have documented that released offenders return to only a few 
Tallhassee neighborhoods.67 Recent data from Ohio document a similar 
phenomenon of concentration of offenders in Cleveland neighborhoods.68 And, 
Lynch, Sabol, and Shelley show through Maryland Corrections data that the 
median neighborhood incarceration rate in Baltimore for men 18 to 34 years 
old was 2.7% - the highest rate, however, was 22%. Five percent of Baltimore 
neighborhoods accounted for 25% of admissions that year, and 10% of the 
neighborhoods accounted for 40% of admissions.69 The data plausibly show 
that incarceration is prevalent enough in some communities to affect social 
organization. The data regarding negative effects of these levels of 
incarceration are also telling. 
65. See generally Meares, Social Organization, supra note 63, at 205-10; Dina R. 
Rose & Todd R. Clear, Incarceration, Social Capital, and Crime: Implications for Social 
Disorganization Theory, 36 CRIMINOLOGY 441 (1998). 
66. An estimated 12% of black males m their twenties and early thirties were in prison 
or jail in 2002, compared to 1.6% of white and 4.3% of Hispanics. Paige M. Harrison & 
Jennifer C. Karberg, United States Dep't of Justice, Prison and Jail Inmates at 
Midyear 2002 (2002). 
67. See Todd R. Clear, Dina R. Rose, Elin Waring & Kristen Scully, Coercive 
Mobility and Crime: A Preliminary Examination of Concentrated Incarceration and Social 
Disorganization, 20 JUST. Q. 33 (2003). 
68. See James P. Lynch & William J. Sabol, Assessing the Effects of Incarceration on 
Informal Social Control in Communities, 3 Criminology & Pub. Pol'y (forthcoming 2004) 
(reviewing quantitative and qualitative research on community effects of incarceration). 
69. See id. 
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Lynch and Sabol canvassed existing studies of the impact of high levels of 
incarceration on urban communities. Specifically they assessed research 
regarding the impact of incarceration on labor force participation, income and 
community, family formation and maintenance, and community organization. 
They concluded that the studies connecting the negative impact of 
incarceration on the labor force is quite persuasive, and that there is some 
evidence that incarceration undermines community-level parochial controls70 
in residential communities.71 While Lynch and Sabol note that large empirical 
studies have not unequivocally demonstrated that incarceration has adversely 
affected private controls and families, there is ethnographic work that is 
suggestive of this thesis. 
One such study that looks at the costs of incarceration was implemented by 
anthropologist (and soon-to-be lawyer) Donald Braman. He conducted more 
than two hundred interviews over a three-year period with fifty families living 
in the Washington, DC area. Each of these families was located in a poor, 
mostly minority neighborhood where the male incarceration rate exceeded two 
percent.72 These interviews contain valuable insights concerning the effects of 
incarceration on family life. Through a recounting of the experiences of several 
families, Braman explains that the most costly expense that families of the 
incarcerated must regularly bear is collect calls from the inmate. It turns out 
that correctional facilities contract out for phone services, and facilities select 
carriers based on which carrier will provide the facility with the highest fee - 
not which company will provide cheapest service for the inmate. According to 
the families Braman interviewed, ten dollar fees for ten-minute conversations 
were not uncommon.73 In addition to phone calls, families bear the expenses of 
visits, which can include car rental or some other form of transportation, hotels, 
childcare, and, of course, food.74 If costs associated with maintaining legal 
battles on appeal and with stress-related medical expenses that some left- 
behind family members experience when a loved one is incarcerated are added 
to the list, it is easy to see how these direct costs of incarceration add up 
quickly - especially given that such expenses must be borne by families in the 
worst position to deal with them.75 
70. See generally Tracey L. Meares, Praying for Community Policing, 90 Cal. L. 
Rev. 1593 (2002) (explaining three-levels of social control - individual, parochial, and 
public - and noting the ways in which parochial controls enhance informal norms of law- 
abidingness). 
71 . See Lynch & Sabol, supra note 68. 
72. Donald Braman, Families and Incaceration, in Invisible Punishment 10 (Marc 
Mauer & Meda Chesney-Lind eds., 2002). 
73. See id. at 4. 
74. See ADRIAN NICOLE Le Blanc, Random Family 164 (2003) (describing in 
addition to the costs just mentioned, the expenses one young mother incurred for the 
purchase of new clothes for her children so the father would see them "dressed - stylishly"); 
Braman, supra note 72, at 4-5. 
75. The direct annual expenses one family incurred resulting from a family member's 
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Braman also shows how family members left behind withdraw from their 
own families. Increased economic costs sometimes force female partners of the 
incarcerated (or their mothers or sisters) to turn to extended family for financial 
assistance, childcare, and other resources. But the assistance extended family 
members can offer is limited by their own constrained finances. Eventually, 
extended family members begin to resent the burden of caring for family 
members whose partners are incarcerated. One woman Braman interviewed 
shares, "My mother can't even hear me talk about him. She'll be like, 'What? 
Are you crazy?'"76 This woman stopped talking to her own extended family 
about her husband and ended up turning only to his sisters for help. This kind 
of isolation from family networks is clearly inconsistent with promotion of 
social norms in favor of positive neighborhood outcomes. 
Work of ethnographers, such as Braman, together with analysis of large 
community-level surveys, such as the Project of Human Development in 
Chicago Neighborhoods supported by the MacArthur Foundation, is needed to 
help to solidify the connections between theory and experience of people in 
disadvantaged neighborhoods in ways that make incarceration as punishment 
more concrete. Through examination of this work, it becomes clear that the 
study of deterrence through abstract discussions of prison sentences and likely 
individual responses, without attention to the social realities of such 
punishment and the growing body of research regarding these realities, leaves 
gaping holes in the education of law students about the operation of criminal 
law. 
E. Punishment Practice and Legitimacy 
One area where there is increasing interest among criminal law scholars is 
the work of social psychologists and the theories that they have offered to 
explain compliance with the law. The issue is a critical one in criminal law as 
the basic theories of deterrence taught in criminal law courses posit promotion 
of compliance with the law as an important reason for punishing people. 
Theories of deterrence assume that compliance is instrumental. That is, people 
comply with the law because they fear the consequences of failing to do so. 
But social psychologists offer another view of compliance with the law - a 
view that is notably absent from widely used criminal law casebooks.77 
incarceration came to $12,680. See Donald Braman, Doing Time on the Outside: The 
Hidden Effects of Incarceration on Families and Communities 151 tbl.2. (forthcoming 
2004). This amount is borne by a handful of people, none of whom earned more than 
$20,000 per year. 
76. Donald Braman, Families and the Moral Economy of Incarceration, in Criminal 
Justice: Retribution vs. Restoration 27-50 (Eleanor Judah & Michael Bryant eds., 
2004). 
77. It is difficult to cite to the absence of material. I reviewed several criminal law 
casebooks including, Sanford H. Kadish & Stephen J. Schulhofer, Criminal Law and 
its Processes: Cases and Materials (7th ed. 2001); Kaplan et al., supra note 7; LaFave, 
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The social psychologists point to normative bases for compliance rather 
than instrumental ones, and they have connected voluntary compliance with the 
law to the fact that individuals believe the law is "just" or because they believe 
that the authority enforcing the law has the right to do so.78 These factors are 
considered normative because individuals respond to them differently from the 
way they respond to rewards and punishments. In contrast to the individual 
who complies with the law because she is responding to externally imposed 
punishments, the individual who complies for normative reasons does so 
because she feels an internal obligation.79 It is "[t]he suggestion that citizens 
will voluntarily act against their self-interest [that] is the key to the social value 
of normative influences."80 
Social psychology also provides assistance in answering what it means to 
say that "authorities have the right to dictate proper behavior." Psychologists 
Allan Lind and Tom Tyler argue that processes that lead up to an outcome are 
important indicators to individuals about how the authority in question views 
the group to which the evaluator perceives herself belonging. Their theory, 
called the "group value" model, maintains that procedural justice may have a 
greater impact than other justice theories of legitimacy (such as a theory 
arguing that people will evaluate authorities as legitimate when authorities 
make decisions that benefit them in the long run)81 because the use of 
procedures regarded as fair by all parties facilitates the maintenance of positive 
relations among group members, preserving the fabric of society, even in the 
face of the conflict of interest that exists in any group whose members have 
different preference structures and different beliefs concerning how the group 
should manage its affairs.82 Putting this point another way, procedures might 
be considered more "trait-like"83 than outcomes, which are variable, or which 
may be extremely indeterminate in a particular case. While it may not be 
obvious how a particular case should come out, it is almost always clear how 
supra note 7; Fundamentals of Criminal Law, supra note 7; Saltzburg et al., supra note 
7. Professor Paul Robinson's treatise is a noteworthy exception. He gives fleeting attention 
to the research discussed in this section. See Paul H. Robinson, Criminal Law 21 (1997). 
Of course few professors use treatises as primary texts for teaching. 
78. See, e.g.,  R. Tyler, Why People Obey the Law 3-4 (1990) [hereinafter 
Tyler, Why People Obey]. 
79. Id at 24. 
80. Id. 
81. See, e.g., John W. Thibaut & Harold H. Kelley, The Social Psychology of 
Groups (1959) (developing a theory of social behavior called social exchange theory which 
posits outcomes as a major determinant of perceived fairness). 
82. See E. Allan Lind &  R. Tyler, The Social Psychology of Procedural 
Justice 230-41 (1988) (developing the group value model to explain instances in which 
people confer legitimacy even when outcomes do not accrue to their benefit). 
83. See Joel Brockner & Phyllis Siegel, Understanding the Interaction Between 
Procedural and Distributive Justice: The Role of Trust, in TRUST IN ORGANIZATIONS: 
Frontiers of Theory and Research 390, 404 (Roderick M. Kramer & Tom R. Tyler eds., 
1996). 
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parties should proceed and be treated in that particular case. 
The latter point drives the relational view of procedural justice. Individuals 
care about how they are treated by government authorities because treatment 
provides important indicators to individuals about how the authority in 
question views the group to which the individual evaluator perceives herself 
belonging. In order to make this assessment, individuals focus on three factors: 
standing, neutrality, and trust.84 By standing, researchers are referring to 
indications that the authority recognizes an individual's status and membership 
in a valued group, such as polite treatment and treatment that accords dignity 
and respect, such as concern for rights.85 Neutrality refers to indications that 
decisions in which the perceiver is not made to feel as if she is less worthy than 
others because of bias, discrimination, and incompetence.86 And trust refers to 
the extent to which a perceiver believes that the authority in question will act 
fairly and benevolently in the future.87 Of course, individuals making 
assessments do not disaggregate their assessments in terms of these factors; 
rather, they come to conclusions about authorities by considering information 
that is relevant to these factors. 
Empirical work is quite persuasive that these legitimacy factors matter 
more to compliance than instrumental factors, such as sanctions imposed by 
authorities on individuals who fail to follow the law or private rules. For 
example, in a study designed to test compliance directly, Tyler used regression 
analyses to test the relative impact on the compliance of respondents of 
legitimacy, public deterrence, peer disapproval, and personal morality (cite). 
He found that the regression estimate for legitimacy on compliance was about 
five times greater than the estimate for deterrence.88 Other studies exploring 
the relationship between legitimacy and behavior related to compliance, such 
as acceptance of arbitration awards89 and decision acceptance and rule 
84. Tom R. Tyler & E. Allan Lind, A Relational Model of Authority in Groups, 25 
Advances in Experimental Soc. Psychol. 115, 158-59 (1992). 
85. See id. at 153 (collecting studies); see also Tom R. Tyler, What Is Procedural 
Justice?: Criteria Used By Citizens to Assess the Fairness of Legal Procedures, 22 Law & 
Soc'yRev. 103, 129 (1998) (discussing importance of recognition of citizen's rights). 
86. Tyler & Lind, sm>ranote84, at 157. 
87. See Tom R. Tyler, Trust and Democratic Governance, in Trust and Governance 
269-70 (Valerie Braithwaite & Margaret Levi eds., 1998). 
88. Specifically, the regression estimates are .11** for legitimacy and .02 (not 
significant) for deterrence. Tyler, Why People Obey, supra note 78, at 59, tbl.5.1. Both of 
these estimates of reliability were adjusted. To put these estimates in perspective, note that 
the estimates for the impact of age and sex on compliance are .24*** and .26***, 
respectively. Id. 
89. See generally E. Allan Lind, Carol T. Kulik, Maureen Ambrose & Maria 
deVera Park, Outcome and Process Concerns in Organizational Dispute 
Resolution (Am. Bar Found., Working Paper No. 9109, 1991) (finding that the decisions 
of parties to accept or reject arbitration awards were strongly related to procedural justice 
(legitimacy) judgments and that outcome favorability judgments operated only through 
procedural justice judgments); Robert J. MacCoun, E. Allan Lind, Deborah R. 
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following in business settings,90 have found that legitimacy has a profound 
impact on behavior. 
It is important to see that the research does not imply that instrumental 
means of producing compliance have no effect. In each of the studies cited 
here, deterrence or outcome-based judgments influenced compliance or related 
behavior in some way. Still, the work suggests that legitimacy is typically more 
important to compliance than instrumental reasons. 
When one is thinking about punishment, this idea is a central one. Reliance 
on carrots and sticks to produce compliance can be a costly strategy. Programs 
featuring rewards and punishments can be costly because instrumental means 
of producing compliance are rarely self-sustaining; rather, authorities must be 
willing to maintain mechanisms of instrumental compliance. For example, if 
deterrence is to be produced by maintaining a certain probability of detection 
of rule-breakers, then authorities must be willing to devote resources to 
maintenance (or increase) of the desired level of police to ensure that the 
requisite probability of detection is met. Therefore, instrumental means of 
producing compliance always depend on resource limits. Legitimacy as a 
means of producing compliance, in contrast, does not always depend on 
resource limits because legitimacy can be acquired simply by changing 
procedures and practices of current officials in ways that require almost no 
additional resources. For example, some research indicates that police who 
regularly treat arrestees with courtesy are more likely than those who do not to 
be viewed as legitimate.91 While police officers may not like to be told to be 
more polite to arrestees, this research suggests that law enforcement gains 
could be achieved more cheaply than through more instrumental means simply 
by telling officers to "be nice." Once established, perceived legitimacy can 
support acceptance of decisions. We should, therefore, expect greater 
compliance in communities where police treat arrestees with greater respect 
Hensler, David L. Bryant & Patricia A. Ebener, Alternative Adjudication: An 
Evaluation of the New Jersey Automobile Arbitration Program (1988) (finding that 
the probability of litigants in cases involving auto claims in New Jersey courts accepting 
arbitrator's award correlated with legitimacy and outcome favorability). 
90. See generally P. Christopher Earley & E. Allan Lind, Procedural Justice and 
Participation in Task Selection: The Role of Control in Mediating Judgments, 52 J. 
Personality & Soc. Psychol. 1 148 (1987) (examining the influence of the fairness of task 
assignment procedures on individual's acceptance of assignments and finding acceptance 
influenced by procedural justice measures); T.R. Tyler & R. Schuller, A Relational Model 
of Authority in Work Organizations: The Psychology of Procedural Justice (1990) 
(unpublished manuscript, on file with the authors) (noting that procedural justice was the 
most consistent predictor of decision acceptance, rule following, turnover intention, and 
grievance filing). 
91. See, e.g., Raymond Paternoster, Ronet Bachman, Robert Brame & Lawrence W. 
Sherman, Do Fair Procedures Matter? The Effect of Procedural Justice on Spouse Assault, 
31 Law & Soc'Y Rev. 163, 1922 (1997) (demonstrating that when police treated arrestees 
with more respect, such as not handcuffing them in front of the victim, recidivism rates were 
lower). 
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than communities where police do not, even if the former community does not 
hire any more police officers. The lesson of this work for criminal law is that 
the practice and procedures of punishment can matter just as much (if not 
more) than the amount of punishment itself to achieving the goal of 
compliance. 
II. Punishment and Modernity: Computer Crimes 
Many traditional courses in criminal law used to spend a great deal of time 
on the crime of theft. The modern course eschews all of that, by beefing up the 
study of the general part of criminal law, from theories of punishment to 
studies of vagueness and the like. Often times, the only two crimes students 
learn about in any systematic way are rape and murder. 
This movement away from teaching theft has both advantages and 
disadvantages. On the one hand, teaching an offense like theft permits students 
to test their concepts in a less freighted setting, in contrast to discussions about 
rape and murder that may be burdened by their enormous emotional and 
philosophical complexity. But, on the other hand, theft, unlike the other two 
offenses, is so removed from the lives of many law students that discussions 
can become unwieldy and abstract. 
One promising solution is for a teacher to cover a modern analogue to 
theft, and one that a great many of today's law students have in fact committed: 
music piracy.92 The "No Electronic Theft Act" passed by Congress provides 
that anyone who downloads more than $1000 in music within a half-year 
period is guilty of a felony.93 Millions of Americans, including, presumably, 
many readers of this Article, have violated this Act and are potential federal 
felons. And unlike the traditional criminal law course that focuses on crimes 
with ancient roots, thinking about computer crime invites a discussion about 
92. Pew Internet and American Life Project Survey 4-5 (July 2003), available at 
http://www.pewintemet.org/reports/pdfs/PIP_Copyright_Memo.pdf (last visited Mar. 11, 
2004): 
[YJoung adults continue to dominate downloading - more than half of all Internet users 
between the ages of 18 and 29 have ever downloaded music and almost 10% of those in that 
age group are online downloading music on any given day . . . students are also more likely 
to be music downloaders than non-students. Fifty-six percent of full-time students and 40% 
of part-time students report downloading music files to their computer . . . Seventy-two 
percent of online Americans aged 1 8 to 29 say they do not care whether the music they 
download onto their computers is copyrighted or not .... 
see also Meredith Amdur, Downloading Dips, Variety, Aug. 25-31, 2003, at 106 
("Investment bank Bear Stearns estimates the actual dollar figure of the pirated market, 
including downloaded files, to be $9 billion-$14 billion annually."); Lev Grossman, It's All 
Free!; Music! Movies! TV shows! Millions of People Download Them Every Day. Is Digital 
Piracy Killing the Entertainment Industry?, Time, May 5, 2003, at 60 (according to the 
article, each month 2.6 billion files are illegally downloaded "and that's just music. That 
number doesn't include the movies, TV shows, software and video games that circulate 
online"). 
93. 17 U.S.C. §506(2004). 
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how to structure an ideal set of prohibitions, freed from the trappings of a 
longstanding discourse and evolved set of rules and doctrine that already 
govern the subject. 
Consider the questions that arise from thinking about criminal law in this 
modern setting. What is the proper role of criminal law when its prohibitions 
are flouted by so many? Are there alternatives to the criminal system that are 
appropriate in such instances? These are issues that repeatedly arise in criminal 
law, most obviously with prohibitions on drugs. Should the answer differ here? 
The answers to these tough questions become even harder to grasp when it 
is understood that computers and other forms of technology, like people, are 
rarely inherently "good" or "evil." The most ardent defenders of file sharing of 
music, for example, have to deal with the fact that these networks are used to 
share child pornography. The staunch movement for Internet freedom, 
similarly, has trouble once it is pointed out that computers can facilitate a 
variety of offenses, from terrorism to complicated fraud. Yet the claims by law 
enforcement, as well as those of copyright holders such as record labels, often 
go too far as well, by making legal arguments and demanding architectures of 
control that threaten the network and much of the good the Internet generates. 
While some forms of computer crime may physically threaten human 
beings, most of the harm occurs within cyberspace itself - with harm to private 
data, financial well being, and online reputations. This, too, makes computer 
crime different than most traditional crimes, like rape and murder, where 
physical harm is an integral part of the offense. And the monetary harm, for its 
part, can be huge. Until the attacks on the World Trade Center of September 
11, 2001, for example, the launch of the "I Love You" virus by a couple of 
very young men in the Philippines may have been the most damaging single 
economic attack in history, with more than $11 billion in losses.94 
The high dollar/low physical harm combination generates attacks on two 
flanks. From one side, some believe that there should be greater sentencing 
equity between white collar criminals (the archetype of whom is an older CEO 
of a corporation) and those individuals who commit other forms of crime. Yet 
those who espouse that equity principle generally do not extend it to computer 
criminals. Why should computer criminals be treated more leniently than other 
forms of white collar crime? Is it the youth, inexperience, relative lack of 
financial means, or something else that the archetypical computer criminal 
possesses? From the other flank, some believe that crimes that do not involve 
violence should not be severely punished. Here, the archetypical crime is the 
consumption of marijuana. Yet, with billions of dollars potentially at stake, is it 
inappropriate to use massive penalties to punish, deter, and incapacitate 
cybercriminals? If the dollars themselves aren't a good reason, what is? 
94. Harvey Stark, e Virus Signs Marketing and Sales Contract and Readies for 
Expansion, Bus. Wire, Aug. 1, 2000, 8/1/00 BWIRE 09:21:00 ("[T]he 'I Love You' virus 
caused estimated damages of US$1 1 billion worldwide in May, 2000."). 
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Consider, for example, the rich density of networks and human interaction that 
have sprung up around the Internet, and whether computer crime (whether in 
the form of privacy violations, spam, viruses, or hacking) might threaten to rip 
those networks apart. 
The lack of physical harm also helps students understand that there are 
always other solutions to criminal problems apart from penal sanctions. When 
Smith maims Jones, the natural impulse is to punish Smith, and only later (if at 
all) perhaps think about punishing those who might have facilitated Smith's 
maiming. But crimes are not just a function of personal impulse; they often are 
the result of poor design and monitoring. In brief, much crime is the result of 
bad architecture - architecture that separates city residents from one another; 
architecture that makes it difficult for residents to self-police because they 
cannot see each other; architecture that emphasizes frightening residents 
instead of promoting openness.95 Instead of seeing this architecture as the end- 
result of downtowns scarred by crime, it is worth asking whether that 
architecture helped produce such crimes in the first place. Yet the traditional 
focus in criminal law on the individual offender obscures these questions. 
Computer crime, in contrast is a place where architectural considerations 
are obvious and omnipresent.96 If music piracy is a problem, for example, a 
natural inquiry is whether the anonymous, end-to-end design of the Internet, is 
worth the cost. If child pornographers are using email to send images back and 
forth, it must be asked whether technical methods that attack the ability to send 
email anonymously using Internet Service Providers are appropriate. Some of 
these solutions may supplant the role of the criminal law altogether. They may 
require enforcement through tort or contract law with third parties, but they can 
have the advantage of preventing crimes before they happen. And once those 
questions are asked with the Internet, they may be asked, with greater 
frequency, in the offline context as well. 
As has been evident, we do not seek here to resolve the thorny questions 
that arise from the new crimes involving computers. We pose them as 
examples of ways in which modern understandings of crime and punishment 
can be brought to bear on concrete problems with relevance to the lives of our 
students. 
III. What Does Punishment Mean? 
Scholars in recent years have devoted considerable attention to the 
expressive theory of punishment.97 This theory is best understood as part of a 
95. See generally Neal Kumar Katyal, Architecture as Crime Control, 1 1 1 Yale LJ. 
1039 (2002). 
96. See generally Neal Kumar Katyal, Digital Architecture as Crime Control, 112 
Yale L.J. 2261(2003). 
97. See, e.g., Robert Nozick, Philosophical Explanations 370-74 (1981); Marc 
Galanter & David Luban, Poetic Justice: Punitive Damages and Legal Pluralism, 42 Am. U. 
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more general account of rationality, which says that we can't make sense of 
individual and group behavior without taking account of its social meaning.98 
Against the background of social norms, actions (including laws) express 
attitudes towards these goods. Behavior that evinces insufficient comment to 
the value of other persons or other important goods strikes us as morally 
wrongful. We are moved to punish individuals who engage in such behavior 
not just to inflict deserved suffering, or to deter like transgressions, but to show 
that we, unlike the offending actor, are committed to the good that their actions 
denigrate." 
No popular casebook makes use of the expressive theory in a systematic 
way. Perhaps influenced by the recent scholarship on it, some include reference 
to it when introducing students to theories of punishments generally.100 But 
none attempts to integrate the expressive theory into the presentation and 
analysis of substantive criminal law doctrines, which they continue to analyze 
(with varying degrees of explicitness) according to the conventional theories of 
"individual desert" and "deterrence." This approach, in our view, seriously 
limits students' capacities to understand and evaluate criminal law. 
Consider, for example, intentional homicide gradations. Conventionally, 
jurisdictions distinguish between first degree "premeditated" murder; second 
degree intentional but unpremeditated murder; and voluntary manslaughter, 
which consists of an intentional killing committed in the "heat of passion" and 
caused by "adequate provocation."101 On their surface, these doctrines appear 
to grade intentional homicides according to the quality of volition reflected in 
the act of killing. Jurists and commentators justify this feature of the doctrine 
on the ground that actors who freely "choose" to kill are either more deserving 
or more deterrable than those who kill impulsively.102 Casebooks, if they offer 
any theoretical guidance at all, typically reflect this conventional wisdom. 
But the conventional wisdom fails to survive even modest interrogation. 
"Premeditation," as any thoughtful instructor will acknowledge, is a legal 
L. Rev. 1393, 1432-38 (1993) (applying theory to punitive damages); Jean Hampton, An 
Expressive Theory of Retribution, in Retributivism and Its Critics (Wesley Cragg ed., 
1992); Dan M. Kahan, What Do Alternative Sanctions Mean?, 63 U. Chi. L. Rev. 591 
(1996) [hereinafter Kahan, Alternative Sanctions}; Igor Primoratz, Punishment as Language, 
64 Philosophy 187 (1989). 
98. For general treatments of the expressive theory, see Elizabeth Anderson, Value 
in Ethics and Economics 17-43 (1993); Lawrence Lessig, The Regulation of Social 
Meaning, 62 U. Chi. L. Rev. 943 (1995). For expressive theories of punishment, see Joel 
Feinberg, Doing and Deserving: Essays in the Theory of Responsibility 95-118 
(1970); Jeffrie G. Murphy & Jean Hampton, Forgiveness and Mercy (1988); Nozick, 
supra note 97, at 370-74; Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 LAW & 
Contemp. Probs. 401 (1958); Kahan, Alternative Sanctions, supra note 97, at 597-606. 
99. Hampton, supra note 97, at 6. 
100. See, e.g., Kadish & Schulhofer, supra note 77, at 105-06 (7th ed. 2001) 
(excerpting Feinberg, supra note 98). 
101. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 1111-12(2004). 
102. See, e.g., Bullock v. United States, 122 F.2d 213, 214 (D.C. Cir. 1941). 
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fiction; in most jurisdictions, a defendant can be found to have "premeditated" 
a killing in the time it takes her to form the "intent" to kill.103 This approach 
not only completely obliterates any doctrinal distinction between first-degree 
and second-degree murder, it also affords juries complete discretion to treat 
impulsive, unplanned intentional killings as first-degree ones if they are so 
inclined. Voluntary manslaughter doctrine displays a similarly uneven 
sensitivity to the mitigating effects of compromised volition: Unprovoked 
killings can be every bit as impulsive as provoked ones, yet are completely 
outside the ambit of the doctrine.104 
It's much easier to understand intentional homicide gradations 
expressively. A person's impulses - or more colloquially, her 
"passions" - frequently inform our understanding of what her behavior 
means.105 Even if unwilled, strong emotional states are hardly random psychic 
events: What enrages a person (a colleague's insulting remark), what scares her 
(a threat to her child), and whom she hates (persons of a certain sexual 
orientation or ethnicity) all tell us what she cares about. And consistent with 
expressive rationality, we in turn judge the impassioned behavior in a manner 
that expresses our own attitudes toward the goods that their anger, their fear, or 
their hate appraise.106 
It's natural to evaluate the moral reprehensibility of intentional killings in 
this way. We are likely to condemn severely a man who kills a child to gratify 
a sexually sadistic urge precisely because his impulse, however difficult to 
control, reveals values we abhor. We are unlikely to condemn nearly so 
severely a mother who kills a child molester out of vengeance, even if she 
plans the killing in advance, precisely because her emotional motivation 
expresses values (including devotion to her daughter) we approve of. The 
"fiction" of premeditation reflects the predictable responsiveness of judges to 
this expressive style of appraisal.107 
The discriminating character of voluntary manslaughter doctrine can be 
made sense of in the same way. The anger of someone who kills without 
provocation can't express reasonable values, but the anger of someone who is 
adequately provoked can. Indeed, it's only when it denigrates an interest that 
social norms entitle din offender to value extremely highly that the victim's 
transgression will be deemed an "adequate provocation;" if the victim threatens 
103. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Drum, 58 Pa. 9, 16 (1868); see also Dressler, supra 
note 23, at 195-97 (discussing fictional nature of premediation). 
104. Dan M. Kahan & Martha C. Nussbaum, Two Conceptions oj Emotion in Criminal 
Law, 96 Colum. L. Rev. 269, 306 (1996). 
105. See generally id. at 285-97 (describing the evaluative conception of emotion). 
106. Id. at 314-15. This account not only captures the way m which ordinary persons 
think of emotions; it is consistent, too, with contemporary research in the social sciences, 
which treats evaluations as integral to the experience and individuation of emotions. See id. 
at 291-92 (discussing sources). 
107. Mat 324. 
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an interest that social norms don 't permit the offender to value to the same 
degree, the offender's anger, no matter how destructive of his volition, won't 
make him eligible for mitigation.108 Common law jurists, for example, treated 
the infidelity of a man's wife as "adequate provocation" on the ground that 
such behavior is "the gravest possible offence which a wife can commit against 
her husband"109 and "the highest invasion of [his] property" by another 
man,110 but the infidelity of an unmarried woman as inadequate on the ground 
that "the man has no such right to control [an unmarried] woman as a husband 
has to control his wife."111 
The expressive theory is similarly critical in understanding criminal law 
defenses. Conventional understanding, again reflected in most casebooks, 
divides defenses into "justifications" and "excuses."112 The former, which 
include necessity and self-defense (and possibly duress), are said to defeat 
liability on the ground that the defendant's violation of the law generated 
socially desirable consequences. The latter, which include insanity (and 
possibly duress), are said to block conviction for an admittedly undesirable 
action that the defendant, because of compromised volition, was morally 
blameless for committing.113 Conceived of in consequentialist and voluntarist 
terms that ignore the expressive dimension of criminal law, this framework 
again leaves students ill-equipped to make sense of the doctrine in action. 
Consider duress, which defeats liability for a nonhomicide offense 
committed in response to a physical threat that a reasonable person couldn't 
have resisted. Commentators disagree about whether this defense is best 
understood as a justification, on the ground that the threatened state of affairs is 
worse in consequentialist terms than the criminal act; or an excuse, on the 
ground that the threat vitiates the defendant's choice capacities.114 
Neither conceptualization fits real cases particularly well. For example, 
whereas a woman who commits a series of armed robberies to avoid threatened 
108. See id. at 305-09. 
109. Rex v. Greening, 3 K.B. 846, 849 (1913) (U.K). 
1 10. Regina v. Mawgridge, 84 Eng. Rep. 1 107, 1115 (Q.B. 1707) (U.K). 
111. Greening, 3 K.B. at 849. 
1 12. See, e.g., Dressler, supra note 23, at 435-41. 
1 13. See generally George P. Fletcher, Rethinking Criminal Law 759-875 (1978); 
J.L. Austin, A Plea for Excuses, 57 PROC. ARISTOTELIAN Soc'Y 1 (1956-1957), reprinted in 
J.L. Austin, Philosophical Papers 175, 175-76 (J.O. Urmson & G.J. Wamock eds., 3d ed. 
1979); Paul H. Robinson, A Theory of Justification: Societal Harm As a Prerequisite for 
Criminal Liability, 23 UCLA L. Rev. 266, 274-75 (1975) (explaining the theoretical 
distinction between justification and excuse). For a challenge to the utility of the distinction, 
see Kent Greenawalt, The Perplexing Borders of Justification and Excuse, 84 Colum. L. 
Rev. 1897, 1897(1984). 
114. Compare Fletcher, supra note 113, at 830 (excuse), Joshua Dressier, Exegesis 
of the Law of Duress: Justifying the Excuse and Searching for Its Proper Limits, 62 S. Cal. 
L. REV. 1331, 1373 (1989) (same), and Paul H. Robinson, Criminal Law Defenses: A 
Systematic Analysis, 82 Colum. L. Rev. 199, 221-22 (1982) (same), with Wayne R. 
LaFave & Austin W. Scott, Jr., Criminal Law § 5.3(a) (2d ed. 1986) (justification). 
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bodily harm to herself is likely to have a defense, a mother who fails to protect 
her child from abuse in order to avert the same harm is likely not to have 
one.115 Both women submit to the same threat, so it's hard to understand the 
distinction between them on the basis of differences in their choice 
capacities.116 Nor is it satisfying to try to explain the differences in 
consequentialist terms; if anything, the woman who assists in the armed 
robberies seems, in deterrence terms, to warrant more severe punishment than 
the woman who acquiesces in the abuse of her own child, since the former puts 
multiple persons at risk, and the latter only one. 
The difference in results is in fact easy to appreciate in expressive terms. 
The fear of each woman expresses a preference for her own well-being over 
the well-being of one or more other persons. Preferring one's own well-being 
to that of strangers is (for better or worse) perfectly unobjectionable in most 
social contexts; it's not surprising, then, that decisionmakers are likely to feel 
sympathy toward the woman who assists the armed robberies. But it's 
definitely not unobjectionable in our culture for a mother to prefer her own 
welfare to her child's; the woman who acquiesces in abuse of her child in order 
to avoid personal injury is predictably condemned because her fear conveys 
insufficient commitment o values she is conventionally expected to have.117 
The expressive position not only makes it easier for students to explain 
doctrine but also to evaluate it. The expressive underpinnings of the doctrine 
expose the relationship between the law and prevailing norms. Selectively 
mitigating punishment for the cuckold under the voluntary manslaughter 
doctrine reflects, and arguably reinforces, norms that equate male virtue with 
devotion to patriarchal conceptions of honor; selectively denying a duress 
defense to a woman who prefers her own welfare to her child indicates norms 
that equate female virtue with a self-abnegating conception of motherhood. It 
might be inappropriate for the law to strike these stances; those who are 
studying the law should at least give that issue serious thought. Yet when the 
doctrine is conceived of and evaluated in conventional deterrence and desert 
terms - ones that misleadingly focus on consequences and volition abstracted 
from social meaning - these issues never even come into view.118 
115. Compare People v. Romero, 13 Cal. Rptr. 2d 332, 340 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992) 
(holding that there was "a reasonable probability" that expert testimony on "Battered Wife 
Syndrome" would have persuaded jury to accept duress defense), with United States v. 
Webb, 747 F.2d 278, 283-84 (5th Cir. 1984) (no defense), and State v. Lucero, 647 P. 2d 
406, 408-09 (N.M. 1982) (no defense). 
116. Indeed, the cases are likely to come out differently even if the offenders are both 
suffering from the volition-debilitating consequences of "battered woman syndrome." 
Compare Romero, 13 Cal. Rptr 2d at 340 (suggesting viability of defense in case in which 
woman participated in crimes against strangers), with Webb, 147 F.2d at 283-84 (finding no 
defense in case in which woman acquiesced in child abuse). 
117. See Kahan & Nussbaum, supra note 104, at 335. 
118. See Victoria Nourse, The New Normativity: The Abuse Excuse and the 
Resurgence of Judgment in the Criminal Law, 50 Stan. L. Rev. 1435, 1451-61 (1998) 
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In sum, explicit attention to the expressive theory of punishment, not just 
in some abstract discussion of "punishment" put throughout the examination of 
substantive doctrines, is essential to a sophisticated appreciation of the criminal 
law. By giving the expressive view short shrift, existing casebooks risk making 
students obtuse. 
IV. Criminal Law and the Legislative Process 
A final striking gap in existing casebooks is their inattention to the 
growing legal-academic literature on statutory interpretation.119 This literature 
places special emphasis, in particular, on how techniques of statutory 
interpretation interact with the legislative process.120 Such analysis is critical to 
criminal law, because it is a statutory field plain and simple, yearly migrating 
farther and farther from its common law origins. For that reason, no one who 
has failed to engage in sustained reflection on interpretation and the legislative 
process can hope to be a literate criminal lawyer or criminal law scholar. 
To make this point sharply, we'll focus on one particular concept that 
figures centrally in the new field of legislation but that is absent from many 
criminal law casebooks: deliberation forcing. This concept shows that 
lawmaking is a dynamic process: Courts, to be sure, react to the policy 
judgments reflected in legislative enactments, but legislatures also react to the 
policy judgments made by courts when they interpret statutes. 
Judicial interpretations provoke legislative reaction unevenly, however. 
Public choice dynamics, for example, suggest that a legislature will react 
sluggishly to judicial decisions that benefit intensely interested and well- 
organized interest groups at the expense of the general public.121 Social 
psychology suggests that a legislature will react convulsively, in contrast, to 
decisions that touch an emotionally charged issue, even when the threat to the 
public is small or even nonexistent.122 Conscious of these dynamics, a judge 
that desires to promote legislative attention to an issue (or alternatively to 
suppress it) might select a particular statutory interpretation not because she 
considers it the "best" in steady state, but because she regards it as the one best 
calculated to promote (or mute) legislative deliberations. 
(arguing that critics of the "abuse excuse" phenomenon obtusely ignore the contribution that 
social norms and meanings make to perception of how much self-control violent offenders 
possess and how dangerous they are). 
119. William Eskridge is recognized as having initiated this wave of scholarship. See 
William N. Eskridge, Jr., Dynamic Statutory Interpretation (1994). 
120. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Philip P. Frickey & Elizabeth Garrett, Cases 
and Materials on Legislation: Statutes and the Creation of Public Policy (3d ed. 
2001). 
121. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Politics Without Romance: Implications of Public 
Choice Theory for Statutory Interpretation, 74 Va. L. Rev. 275 (1988). 
122. See Timur Kuran & Cass R. Sunstein, Availability Cascades and Risk Regulation, 
51 Stan. L. Rev. 683 (1999). 
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Surprisingly, long before the current literature on dynamic statutory 
interpretation, the English philosopher Jeremy Bentham offered a 
"deliberation-forcing" rationale for construing criminal prohibitions 
narrowly.123 Considered statically, he suggested, "The greatest danger" lies in 
a criminal prohibition that is insufficiently punitive rather than excessively so, 
"because in [the former] case the punishment is inefficacious."124 But it's a 
mistake to evaluate the two types of defects statically. 
[The] error [of insufficient punishment] is ... clear and manifest, and easy to 
be remedied. An error on the maximum side, on the contrary, is that to which 
legislators and men in general are naturally inclined: antipathy, or a want of 
compassion for individuals who are represented as dangerous and vile, pushes 
them onward to an undue severity. It is on this side, therefore, that we should 
take the most precautions, as on this side there has been shown the greatest 
disposition to err.125 
Bentham' s insight - that fear of and revulsion toward criminals makes 
lawmakers reluctant to correct excessively punitive laws - plausibly explains 
why judicial interpretations that disadvantage criminal defendants are among 
the least likely to be overturned.126 Those that advantage criminal defendants, 
in contrast, are regularly overruled, presumably because legislators see plenty 
of advantage in generating legislation that make their constituents feel safer 
and that gratify their resentment of criminals. If these political and 
psychological dynamics do indeed make excessively punitive measures less 
amenable to correction than excessively lenient ones, prodefendant 
interpretations of criminal statues can be defended on deliberation-forcing 
grounds. 
Introducing students to the maxim that courts should construe criminal 
statutes narrowly and resolve ambiguities in favor of defendants - sometimes 
known as the rule of lenity127 - is unfortunately as close as most criminal law 
casebooks get to educating students on these issues of statutory interpretation. 
But as any thoughtful and candid instructor would bring out in the course of 
class discussion, the justifications for the rule, including "fair notice" for 
defendants and the promotion of "legislative supremacy,"128 are contemptibly 
weak. 
123. Jeremy Bentham, Principles of Penal Law, pt. II, bk. 1, ch. 6, in The Works of 
Jeremy Bentham 401 (John Bowring ed., 1843). 
124. Id. 
125. Id. 
126. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overriding Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation 
Decisions, 101 YaleL.J. 331, 413-14 (1991). 
127. See, e.g., Bell v. United States, 349 U.S. 81, 83 (1955) (Frankfurter, J.) ("It may 
fairly be said to be a presupposition of our law to resolve doubts in the enforcement of a 
penal code against the imposition of a harsher punishment."). See generally Dan M. Kahan, 
Lenity and Federal Common Law Crimes, 1994 Sup. . Rev. 345 (1994) [hereinafter 
Kahan, Lenity] (describing and critiquing this rule). 
128. See, e.g., United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 349 (1971). 
1206 STANFORD LAW REVIEW [Vol. 56:1171 
Consider the case that many textbooks use to present this canon, Keeler v. 
Superior Court of Amador County}29 There, the California Supreme Court 
"strictly construed" the term "human being" in the state's murder statute not to 
apply to a 35-week-old fetus.130 It's absurd to suggest that a broad 
interpretation in Keeler would have deprived the defendant of "notice": like 
offenders who engage in the vast multitude of common offenses, those who 
intentionally assault pregnant women for the purpose of causing the death of 
their fetuses, probably don't perform legal research before acting. In addition, 
far from viewing expansive judicial readings as encroaching on its 
prerogatives, the California legislature had expressly repealed the rule of 
strict construction and replaced it with a directive to interpret criminal statutes 
"with a view to effect [their] objects and to promote justice."131 Thus, like 
many other state legislatures,132 California's legislature had authorized 
courts to construe statutes broadly to deter offenders from exploiting 
statutory loopholes and to minimize the legislatures' own burden in 
enacting unrealistically precise statutes.133 Contrary to the platitudes 
invoked to support it, strict construction in fact defies legislative 
supremacy, at least if we take the legislature's own word for it. 
Deliberation-forcing, however, furnishes a much more compelling 
rationale for strict construction in a case like Keeler. All right-thinking persons 
agree that this behavior is bad and that it is more serious and thus presumably 
worthy of more serious punishment than an ordinary assault. But exactly how 
bad, and how much worse? Should the law treat it as the moral equivalent of 
murder? Members of the public might disagree on this issue. Indeed, the 
question of how severely to punish feticide might provoke different responses 
from those who disagree about abortion, precisely because they disagree about 
whether a fetus is indeed a "human life." There's presumably some value in 
having contentious issues like this one resolved through the sort of democratic 
deliberation distinctively associated with the legislative process. If so, then a 
court deciding a case like Keeler ought to consider the following question: 
Which reading of the statute - a narrow one or a broad one - is most likely to 
provoke it? 
The answer, for exactly the reasons Bentham gives, is narrow. A broad 
reading - one that treats the defendant in the case as guilty of murder - is very 
likely to stick, even if too severe relative to sound policy and public mores: 
What member of the legislature who is the least bit interested in his or her own 
reelection is likely to propose legislation making the law more lenient toward 
men who attack pregnant women for the purpose of causing them to miscarry? 
129. 470 P.2d 617 (Cal. 1970). 
130. Keeler, 470 ?.2d at 631. 
131. Cal. Penal Code § 4 (2004). 
132. Livingston Hall, Strict or Liberal Construction of Penal Statutes, 48 Harv. L. 
Rev. 748, 752-54 (1935). 
133. Kahan, Lenity, supra note 127, at 382-84. 
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A narrow reading, in contrast, is nearly certain to provoke public outrage and 
thus to provoke legislative action. The California legislature, for example, did 
act after Keeler, amending the state's murder statute to cover the "killing" of a 
"fetus," as well as a "human being."134 
But because not everyone agrees that feticide is as bad as murder, the 
legislature could at least conceivably have reacted more moderately. The 
Illinois legislature, for example, did: After a similar decision by the Illinois 
Supreme Court,135 the legislature in that state didn't broaden the definition of 
murder; rather, it enacted the distinct offense of "intentional homicide of an 
unborn child."136 Unlike the legislator who proposes ratcheting punishment 
down to some middling level after an antidefendant judicial interpretation, the 
legislator who favors ratcheting it up to that same point after a prodefendant 
interpretation gets full credit for being tough on crime. In sum, which 
interpretive default rule the court selects - narrow or broad - determines not 
only how likely the legislature is to deliberate after a judicial decision but also 
how likely the law is to end up in a position consistent with considered public 
judgments. 
Indeed, the function of deliberation forcing can at least sometimes justify a 
contentiously broad construction of a criminal statute. Bentham's observation 
that legislatures are more attentive to insufficiently severe than to excessively 
severe criminal prohibitions assumes a particular theory of the psychological 
and political economies of criminal lawmaking. On this account, ordinary 
citizens are thought to worry more about insufficient than excessive severity 
because they themselves are afraid of becoming victims of crime and because 
they tend to hate criminals. Legislators, in turn, are thought to be responsive to 
this asymmetry in the attention and concern of their constituents and thus to be 
asymmetrically attentive to the problems of insufficient and excessive severity 
in criminal aws. These are plausible assumptions. 
But these assumptions don't always pertain. In some instances, 
constituents might identify more with potential criminal defendants than with 
crime victims. Or they might sympathize with victims, but imagine the 
prospect that they will become a victim of that sort as essentially nonexistent, 
and thus not care enough to motivate legislative reaction to an insufficiently 
severe criminal prohibition. In at least some of these cases, an arguably 
overbroad reading of a criminal statute might more predictably generate a 
worthwhile legislative response. 
For an example, consider the law of "omissions." The law punishes 
someone whose failure to act causes harm to another only in very narrow 
circumstances - essentially, when that person has a "legal duty" to care for the 
134. Cal. Penal Code § 187(a) (2004). 
135. See People v. Greer, 402 N.E.2d 203, 209 (111. 1980) (holding a fetus is not a 
human being for purposes of state homicide statute). 
136. III. Rev. Stat. ch. 38, f 9-1.2 (2004). 
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victim founded either on a familial or some other fiduciary relationship or on 
contract or some other voluntary assumption of duty.137 The traditional 
rationale for confining the circumstances in which a person has a duty to help 
another in need is rooted in a contentious view of individual liberty that 
immunizes individuals from obligations to others unless they have assumed 
those obligations through choice.138 Many commentators, and in our 
experience most students, find this rationale uncompelling in cases where 
individuals turn their back - often literally - on persons in distress who they 
could easily help with no real risk to themselves. Yet the traditional position 
persists. 
Is the failure of legislatures to change the law evidence that the traditional 
individualist sensibility continues to resonate with common moral sensibilities? 
Not necessarily. Even if most members of society agree that the traditional 
position on omissions is inadequate - that individualistic renunciation of a duty 
to assist strangers in need is anachronistic and even offensive - we shouldn't 
expect legislatures to respond to judicial readings that apply it. The 
prototypical case in which the doctrine of omissions creates liability involves 
an abandoned or abused child who dies from neglect that a stranger could have 
prevented. As distressing and unfortunate as this scenario might strike her, the 
median voter is unlikely to worry much about it: She isn't an abandoned or 
neglected child herself, and she assumes that her child won't ever be abused or 
abandoned and thus won't ever have that unique need of protection from a 
stranger (a fate disproportionately visited on the children of persons much less 
financially secure and socially supported than the median voter). A legislator 
interested in perpetuating his term in office can attend to better issues. Indeed, 
because the median voter is much more likely to worry (without much reason, 
statistically) that a child molester might move into her suburban backyard and 
abduct her child as she plays in the backyard, a smart legislator might do well 
to sponsor legislation obliging local authorities to maintain a public registry of 
convicted pedophiles - even though this law will almost certainly do less to 
protect vulnerable children than would a law reinforcing the duty of individuals 
to give assistance to strangers in need. 
If the traditional aw of omissions persists not because it fits contemporary 
public values but because it generates harm that lacks sufficient emotional 
salience to grab public attention, then broad construction might be the right 
corrective from a deliberation- forcing standpoint. Members of the public might 
not be able to imagine their own children in a persistent state of vulnerability 
that only someone from outside of their immediate family could remedy, but 
they might well be able to imagine finding themselves, through sheer fortuity, 
137. See Jones v. United States, 308 F.2d 307 (D.C. Cir. 1962) (recognizing the law of 
omissions); Model Penal Code § 2.01(3) (Proposed Official Draft 1962) (same). 
138. See generally John Kleinig, Good Samaritanism, 5 PHIL. & Pub. Aff. 382 
(1976); Daniel B. Yeager, A Radical Community of Aid: A Rejoinder to Opponents of 
Affirmative Duties to Help Strangers, 71 WASH. U. L.Q. 1 (1993). 
April 2004] UPDA TING THE STUDY OF PUNISHMENT 1 209 
in a position where their intervention is essential to the well-being of a 
vulnerable child or other stranger in need. A judicial decision that imposed 
liability - perhaps for manslaughter - on a person who failed to intervene in 
that situation would put not just heinous criminals but the median voter herself 
at legal risk. Precisely for that reason, such a decision, especially if rendered in 
a high-profile case, might well prompt a legislative response, one that moved 
the law to some intermediate position between one that equates passive with 
active harming and one that excuses omissions altogether. Alternatively, 
legislative inaction in the wake of such a decision would furnish much more 
plausible evidence of congruence between law and public mores than inaction 
in the wake of decisions enforcing the traditional doctrine. 
This analysis is admittedly conjectural. But the point of a casebook in 
criminal law is precisely to stimulate educational conjecture. The analysis of 
deliberation forcing is meant to illustrate just how generative of conjecturing it 
can be to apply the insights of the field of legislation to criminal law. By 
making students familiar with these insights, we hope to furnish them with a 
toolkit of techniques and dynamics that they can use to explain, predict, and 
criticize criminal law doctrine. 
Conclusion 
Our short review of the many ways in which the new criminal law 
scholarship can enrich the material taught in the criminal law classroom is by 
no means exhaustive. There is much more that could be done. Notably, one 
large area ripe for integration, touched upon only briefly in our Article, is 
addressed by several wonderful contributions to the Punishment and Its 
Purposes Symposium - race and punishment.139 
This novel area of scholarship is just one of a series of sweeping changes 
in method and focus that have convulsed the study of criminal law in the last 
decade. The classical economic conception of how the law regulates criminal 
behavior has been enriched (if not displaced) by a variety of insights drawn 
from social psychology, sociology, and behavioral economics. The long- 
standing academic interest in the classification of "property offenses" has been 
overtaken by the urgent need to adapt the law to forms of wrongdoing 
distinctive of the emerging information economy. The scholastic debate 
between "retributivists" and "utilitarians" has been displaced by a new, 
sociologically informed interest in the social meanings that law expresses. The 
historical (and still fully relevant) interest of scholars in how the criminal law 
is used to enforce racial domination has been supplemented by one in the 
139. See Paul Butler, Much Respect: Toward a Hip-Hop Theory of Punishment, 56 
Stan. L. Rev. 983 (2004); Pamela S. Karlan, Convictions and Doubts: Retribution, 
Representation, and the Debate over Felon Dis enfranchisement, 56 Stan. L. Rev 1147 
(2004); Dorothy E. Roberts, The Social and Moral Cost of Mass Incarceration in African 
American Communities, 56 Stan. L. Rev 1271 (2004). 
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emerging demand of politically empowered innercity minorities for effective 
law enforcement. And just as there has been a recent reconfiguration of 
materials in criminal procedure to take account of changes in the 
scholarship,140 we encourage contemporary criminal law scholars to extend 
their efforts to criminal law teaching materials. 
140. See Stephanos Bibas, The Real-World Shift in Criminal Procedure, 93 J. CRIM. L. 
& Criminology 789 (2003) (reviewing criminal procedure casebooks, Ronald Jay Allen, 
William J. Stuntz, Joseph L. Hoffman & Debra A. Livingston, Comprehensive 
Criminal Procedure (2001) and Marc L. Miller & Ronald F. Wright, Criminal 
Procedures: Cases, Statutes, and Executive Materials (2001), and noting a nascent 
shift from a focus on Supreme Court cases to real world topics such as politics, race, and 
real- world prosecutorial practices). 
